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Abstract 
Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean peninsula raised security 
concerns in the Baltic States as potential targets of invasion. This anxiety was strengthened after 
the EU launched a civilian Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine as a response to Russia’s 
illegal actions.  Such a soft response to Russia’s foray into Ukraine has raised doubts about the 
EU’s credibility as a significant security actor on the international stage. Even though the EU 
has capabilities to intervene militarily, it does not use these capabilities at its disposal. This 
thesis, through the two case studies, tries to find out why the EU is so soft in the Ukrainian crisis 
and if the EU is credible security actor in the Baltic States. The overarching questions addressed 
in this paper are why the EU has not intervened militarily in Ukraine and whether the EU’s soft 
power model would be exercised in the Baltic States in case of Russia’s intervention. In order 
to answer these questions the paper looks through the EU’s previous deployments and the 
critique it received regarding those deployments. Moreover, the study is complemented by other 
researchers’ work who carried out studies on this topic.  The two case studies of this thesis- the 
Ukrainian crisis and the Baltic States- are analyzed through the lenses of realism and 
constructivism. Realism highlights the importance of national interests, meanwhile, 
constructivism brings attention to identity and meaning- making factors which may influence 
the EU’s actions in international environment. The paper has also benefited from the survey 
results provided by the officials from the Baltic States. The results showed that the EU deployed 
a civilian mission because of identity and image related reasons, which can be translated as 
supranational responsibility for peace- keeping. However, any hard means were opposed by the 
member states because of economic and national interests with Russia. Meanwhile, the Baltic 
States perceive Russia as a real threat to their national security due to both identity related and 
national- political interests, and the risk of Russia’s intervention is evaluated as very big. 
Howbeit, the analysis shows that the Baltic States run risk of experiencing the EU’s soft 
response in case of Russia’s intervention.  
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Introduction 
 
“The legacy of the Second World War with its tremendous destruction in Europe marked a past 
that the European leaders were determined not to repeat”.1 Therefore, the old rivalries between 
Western European counties were replaced with diplomatic dialogue and compromise. Such 
intentions of a peaceful world order led to the establishment of Western European Union which 
later became the European Coal and Steel Community. The first attempt of the European 
countries to establish a security institution was the European Defense Community, which, 
however was not ratified by France due to its political opposition. With the abolition of the 
project, a more traditional military alliance was created- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).2 Even though NATO pooled military capabilities of its Member States, the 
implementation of the European foreign policy was not dead with the creation of NATO, on the 
contrary, the European Community was established with the aim to deepen security and stability 
in Western Europe.3 However, the first serious steps towards the formation of a European 
foreign policy were taken only in the 1970s with the establishment of the European Political 
Co-operation (EPC). The EPC was a channel for discussions between the Member States on 
their positions regarding foreign affairs.4 In 1992 the EPC was transformed into Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which enlarged debates on European security and its role 
in this context. With the increasing security challenges in its periphery such as Balkans and the 
South Caucasus, the debates regarding the EU’s military capabilities as a necessity to meet the 
security issues and as a necessity to complement the existing soft security tools were sparked.5 
In this regard, the biggest attempt to develop such a capacity was the formation of the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). From the beginning, the EU leaders insisted that the CSDP 
should have a military force in order to project power and become a significant security actor. 
Such a desire led to the creation of Rapid Reaction Forces and later the Battle Groups. However, 
                                                          
1Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation 
Perspective (Routledge, 2008), 9.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 10. 
5 Maria Raquel Freire and Lícinia Simão, "The Eu's Security Actorness: The Case of Eumm in Georgia," European 
Security 22, no. 4 (2013): 464.  
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the fact that the Battle Groups have never been deployed raises a question about the EU’s ability 
to meet the security challenges with its hard instruments.6  
Going back to the goal of the EU’s founding countries, which was to prevent war and pursue 
peace in Europe, the military means were not welcome at that time. Due to this reason the EU’s 
security actorness was mostly built on soft security means such as enlargement, stabilization 
and neighborhood policies. As a result most of the CSDP missions have been civilian and, even 
though the EU has capabilities to deploy military missions, it fosters civilian dimensions of its 
security actorness such as police training, border monitoring or rule of law missions. 7 In general, 
the academic world provides with a particular description of the EU as an actor of its own kind, 
called “sui generis” due to several reasons. Firstly, seeing an institution as an actor contradicts 
with the traditional realist approach which declares that only a state can be an actor. Secondly, 
the EU of the very nature of the institution is neither a state nor a common institution.8 As 
Bretherton and Vogler stated, the EU’s “sui generis” nature has challenged traditional notion of 
security where being an actor does not always mean being militarized.9 According to Tardy, 
being an actor is a goal of the EU and the EU’s CSDP is supposed to make the EU more than 
just the sum of state policies.  In this respect, the development of the CSDP and the EU- led 
operations have transformed the EU into a security actor which can not be associated  just with 
its Member States.10 Furthermore, the CSDP is the EU’s unique instrument to act and be visible. 
In other words, such an agency plays a role for its external image construct and self- 
identification. While analyzing the EU’s actorness in the security field, the existence of a 
strategic culture or what the EU considers about security is a crucial factor in threat assessment 
and management, which leads or not to the decision to use force. According to Thierry Tardy, a 
senior analyst in the crisis management, such an approach is weak in the EU’s foreign policy 
field due to diverging positions of the EU’s Member States on the use of force. 11  
                                                          
6 Asle Toje, "The European Union as a Small Power," Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (2011): 49. 
7 Freire and Simão,  466. 
8 Thierry Tardy, European Security in a Global Context: Internal and External Dynamics (Routledge, 2008), 28. 
9 John Vogler and Charlotte Bretherton, European Union as a Global Actor (Washington, DC : Routledge), Book 
Electronic document. 
10 Tardy. 
11 Ibid., 29-30. 
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The EU as a security actor has undertaken many operations in different geographical zones- the 
Balkans, Africa, Asia, Middle Est, Europe while using civilian or military measures in the 
framework of the CSDP.  Even Though the geographical spectrum of the missions is quite 
impressive, however, 80 percent of them refer to civilian missions. Such statistics complies with 
Duchene statement that the EU is fundamentally a civilian power.12 According to Sven Biscop, 
a professor in political science at Ghent University, relatively small, unarmed civilian missions 
are supported and favored easier by the Member States as they are less expensive, less dangerous 
and less controversial than military ones13, which indicates that the EU is faithful to a “soft 
approach”14. In addition, the missions under the CSDP has received a lot of criticism for being 
small scale, risk averse, modest military, lacking security strategy, leadership and consensus 
between the Member States, based on cost benefit calculations and etc. As Katarina Engberg 
also pointed, the EU’s military missions can be considered as a quiet and modest success with 
small results.15 Such a critique does not play favorably to the EU’s security role on the 
international stage. On the other hand, despite a number of civilian missions, military missions 
have been on the EU’s agenda as well, which raises a question- under what circumstances the 
EU tends to deploy a military mission versus a civilian one? Katarina Engberg explains this 
pattern through inhibiting and driving factors which lead or not to the EU’s decision to deploy 
a military mission.  
The EU went a long way to lay the foundation for the EU’s security architecture. However, 
Russia’s military intervention in eastern Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the 
Crimean peninsula directly challenges the EU and its security construction.16 Such a challenge 
was a clear invitation for the EU to act and prove its actorness in the security field. However, 
the EU decided to act soft and launched a civilian mission in Kiev as a support to the Ukrainian 
government and people. Meanwhile, the only actions against Russia’s aggression was 
diplomatic and economic pressure. The events in Ukraine have demonstrated that the threat 
                                                          
12 François Duchêne, "Europe’s Role in World Peace," Europe tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans look ahead 43 
(1972). 
13 Sven Biscop and Richard G. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of European Security. [Elektronisk Resurs], 
Routledge Handbooks (London ; New York : Routledge, 2013., 2013), Non-fiction, 91. 
14 Franck Petiteville, "Exporting ‘Values’?," Understanding the European Union’s external relations  (2003): 135. 
15 Katarina Engberg, "Ten Years of Eu Military Operations," European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief, 
no. 41 (2013). 
16 R. O. Y. Allison, "Russian 'Deniable' Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules," 
International Affairs 90, no. 6 (2014): 1255. 
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coming from Russia is more than real to its neighbors, and in this respect, a special attention is 
drawn to the Baltic States as potential targets of invasion. In general, Russia’s aggressiveness 
in this region is not new, but the events in Ukraine have weakened the sense of security there 
even more. Furthermore, the EU’s reluctant and soft response to the crisis leaves an intriguing 
question- if the EU would be able to defend the Baltics under Russia’s aggression or would it 
take a passive seat there as well?  
While analyzing the EU’s actorness and its capabilities in security issues, and identifying 
driving or inhibiting factors of the EU’s intentions to operate, two case studies are chosen for 
the research analysis: the case of the Ukrainian crisis as an example of the EU’s actions and 
response to the crisis, and the case of the Baltic States regarding their security and the EU’s 
credibility to act in case of any possible threat coming from Russia. The thesis is trying to find 
out why the EU is so soft in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, and if the EU is credible and 
efficient security actor in the Baltic States. In order to tackle the research questions two IR 
theories- Realism and Constructivism- are chosen as a base for the analysis. In addition, the 
analysis is complemented with the survey results which was conducted among the officials from 
the Baltic States.  
In order to answer the research questions, this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 introduces 
with security issues in the Baltic States. Chapter 2 describes security actorness, presents security 
architecture and agencies which interplay in the research analysis. Chapter 3 provides with 
theoretical background on the CSDP and introduces with two IR theories: realism and 
constructivism which will be used as basis for the analysis. Chapter 4 describes the research 
methodology, while chapter 5 represents the analysis of the EU’s actions in the Ukrainian crisis 
and chapter 6 draws attention to the Baltic States regarding their security. Practical analysis of 
both cases is complemented with the results of the survey. Chapter 7 recapitulates major findings 
of the research.  
1. The Baltics in threat 
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Russia’s successful seizure of Ukrainian territory has damaged the European security order 
and left the three most vulnerable states- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania under threat of possible 
Russian subversion or surprise attack. 17 
Exactly a year ago, events started to unravel about a thousand kilometers south of us. 
Today the entire post-Cold War security structure of Europe has been destroyed…A war 
is underway in Ukraine. People are being killed there every day. Even now. This is a new 
type of war, in which one clearly proven combatant is openly using the newest weapons 
while denying everything…If Europe can learn anything at all from the past, it is that 
concessions only cause the aggressor's appetite for new demands to increase.18 
Russia’s actions against Ukraine raised questions regarding regional stability and security, 
moreover, it raised doubts about the European project as a whole and the idea of united Europe. 
The Russian invasion in Ukraine provoked the security concerns in countries from the Baltic to 
the Black Sea and the Caspian basin. However, the biggest fears of intervention is mostly 
generated in the Baltic States, which hold a special place in the geopolitical arena of Moscow.19 
Estonia and Latvia, like Ukraine, have quite sizable ethnic Russian populations, who could 
become a reason for separatists’ movements, and both countries share borders with Russian 
territory. Lithuania has less Russian speakers than Estonia and Latvia, but it has a border with 
Kaliningrad, which is Russian exclave. 20 Russia’s view of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 is 
perceived as a historic accident21, while the Baltic States are treated as “historical Russian 
territory” in the Baltic region.22 The example of Ukraine gives a reasonable fear to the Baltic 
States that Russia may consider having some rights in its “historical territory”. Moreover, from 
                                                          
17 Edward Lucas, "The Coming Storm. Baltic Sea Security Report," Center for European Policy Analysis  (2015): 3. 
18 The Estonian President speech on February 24, 2015 to mark the 97th anniversary of Estonian Independence: 
http://news.err.ee/115259/independence-day-speech-of-estonian-president-ilves 
19 Marianna GLADYSH, "Security of the Baltic States: Effectiveness of the Eu Common Security and Defence 
Policy and Influence of the Ukrainian Crisis," 190. 
20 Jan Osburg, "Unconventional Options for the Defense of the Baltic States,"  (2016): 2. 
21 Artis Pabriks and Andis Kudors, "The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe," (The Centre for East European 
Policy Studies. Rīga: University of Latvia Press, 2015), 53. 
22 GLADYSH,  191. 
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the point of view of Putin the collapse of the Soviet Union is the greatest catastrophe of the 
twentieth century, which left tens of millions of Russian citizens out of their homeland- Russia.23 
Nowadays, the Baltic States are well established democracies, which have been members of the 
NATO and the EU since 2004. Those three small countries went through harsh historical events 
and timeless fights for independence. Russia finds it hard to accept its freedom as many years it 
was in the grip of Russia. Until 1918 the “the three brothers” were part of Tsarist Empire and 
later under the Russian occupation between 1940 and 1991.24 The history of repression is very 
close to the Baltic States and the fear of a possible new intervention is more than realistic.  
The Baltic States are a thin and a tiny fragment of under-populated land which has a border with 
Russia Federation along with Kaliningrad and Belarus and share only 103 km land border with 
Poland. The Baltic States are geographically cut off from most of NATO and the EU by the 
Baltic Sea and, in this respect, the countries appear quite indefensible and separated which was 
a strong argument against the three countries before they became members of NATO. Military 
defense is possible just with large- scale of troops deployed in the area in order to balance a 
potential Russian threat and power. 25 One of the serious security concerns for the Baltics are 
the strategic and military importance of the Kaliningrad exclave which is to be one of Europe’s 
most militarized places today.26 Russia is deploying there thousands of troops, weapons, military 
aircraft, armored vehicles and naval infantries.27 From 2012 Russia has been sending nuclear- 
capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad as a response to NATO’s ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) which Russia perceives as a threat to its national security. 28 Using those missiles with 
a range of 500 km, Russia could easily target not just the Baltic States, but also Poland, parts of 
Germany and Czech Republic.29 In addition, the Baltics are threatened by countless and large 
                                                          
23 NBC, "Putin: Soviet Collapse a Genuine Tragedy," Associated Press, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7632057/ns/world_news/t/putin-soviet-collapse-genuine-
tragedy/#.WO8hPtLyjIU.Accessed February 3, 2017. 
24 Pabriks and Kudors,  59. 
25 Ibid., 57. 
26 Sandra Kaziukonyte, "The Baltics:Security Environment and Practical Responses to the Security Challenges 
from the Crisis in Ukraine,"  (2016): 3. 
27 Tony Wesolowsky, "Kaliningrad, Moscow's Military Trump Card,"  https://www.rferl.org/a/kaliningrad-russia-
nato-west-strategic/27079655.html. Accessed February 13, 2017. 
28 BBC, "Kaliningrad: New Russian Missile Deployment Angers Nato,"  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-38070201. Accessed February 15, 2017. 
29Kaziukonyte. 
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scale Russian military exercises including troops’ presence and military aircrafts near the 
borders. In 2014 the Baltics faced Russian military aircrafts close to their borders around 250 
times. 30 Military pressure including military aircraft, ships, submarines, troops and military 
exercises close to the Baltics’ borders, airspace and maritime zones has been evident.  Russia 
demonstrates a clear message of being ready to take any actions and shows the world that it is 
still a regional super- power. 31 There are no doubts that Russia could attack the Baltics and 
overwhelm them quickly. Such attacks has already been rehearsed during exercise Zapad 2009 
and Zapad 2013, while Zapad 2017 is also in the nearest future. Moreover, the Kaliningrad 
exclave has a direct border with Lithuania and can be reached just through the Polish territory 
or via Belarus through Lithuania and an illegal occupation of the Baltic States would open for 
Russia new and easier road to Kaliningrad. In addition, this Russian exclave can be used as an 
excuse to intervene. For example, Kaliningrad’s dependency on electricity, gas and rail links 
across Lithuania creates potential vulnerabilities. If these links were disrupted for any reason, 
Russia would find an excuse to blame Lithuania and due to humanitarian reasons would 
intervene in order to restore services.32 Moreover, Russian land corridor to Kaliningrad would 
serve as an advantage for Russia in order to isolate the Baltic States from the support of the 
NATO and the EU.33  
Similarly, the Russian actions are also threatening for other Baltic Sea neighbors such as 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Poland (see Appendix 1). For example, Russia 
threatened Denmark for a nuclear strike if the country would contribute to the US- led missile 
defense system in 2015. Sweden were also warned not to use Baltic military airports during 
common Swedish- NATO military exercise in 2015. 34In general, Finland is sharing a 1340 km 
border with Russia, while Sweden, even though does not have a common border with Russia, 
but has the strategically located island of Gotland. Both countries experienced many Russian 
flights close to their borders, which, by no doubt, served as testing tools of their reactions and 
readiness to defend themselves. Moreover, Russia have been sending a clear message of the 
                                                          
30 Artis Pabriks, "How Should Europe React to Russia’s Proposed ‘New World Order’?," The War in Ukraine: 
Lessons for Europe  (2015): 113. 
31 Pabriks and Kudors,  59. 
32 Lucas,  10-11. 
33 Pabriks and Kudors. 
34 Pabriks,  114. 
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consequences if the countries decide to join NATO. Norway and Denmark is in slightly better 
position due to the distance. However, Norway borders Russia in the far North and Denmark 
has Bornholm Island in the Baltic Sea, which was Soviet camp in 1945.35 In June 2014 Russia 
simulated there an attack, while many of the Danish politicians, journalists and many guests 
were holding a meeting there.36 March 2015 marked a new chapter in Russia’s geopolitical 
manner in the Baltic Region. Russian forces rehearsed the invasion of Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland. Russian troops practiced to take over the area of the North of Norway, 
Gotland island of Sweden, Åland island of Finland and Bornholm island of Denmark. While 
capturing these islands Russia would be able to close the Baltic Sea and dominate in the whole 
region. Moreover, while doing so, Russia would be able isolate the Baltic States and, in this 
respect, NATO or the EU would stand helpless.37 The current examples show that Russia is 
threatening not just the Baltic States, but also the whole Baltic Sea Region as it has strategic 
interests there too. Putin sees the Baltic region as the only region where Russia has a direct 
contact with the West. Moreover, the Baltic Sea, before the annexation of Crimea, was the only 
ice free European port. However, all countries of the region have already become members of 
the EU and/ or NATO, which makes it more complicated for Russia to dominate or influence 
the region.38 As Stoicescu remarked, there are many reasons why Putin would attempt to 
reinstate its domination. Firstly, Russia can not influence economically and politically over any 
other countries around the Baltic Sea. Secondly, Russia was left with a very small part of the 
Baltic Sea coastline. Thirdly, the Kaliningrad exclave is over- militarized, costly and hardly 
reachable. 39 While having the Baltic States, Russia would “solve” many problems and would 
regain its influence in the region as a super power.  
The Baltic States, as being members of NATO and the EU, and therefore part of the CSDP, 
should feel safe and secure, however, in case of Russia’s intervention, the NATO’s response 
might arrive too late, meanwhile, their own military capabilities are asymmetric and would not 
                                                          
35 Kalev Stoicescu, "Russian Threat to Security in the Baltic Sea Region," RKK ICDS. October  (2015): 5-6. 
36 "Russia Simulated an Attack on Denmark,"  https://www.thelocal.dk/20141031/russia-simulated-a-military-
attack-on-denmark.Accessed April 17, 2017. 
37 David Blair, "Russian Forces 'Practised Invasion of Norway, Finland, Denmark and Sweden'," The Telegraph, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11702328/Russian-forces-practised-invasion-of-
Norway-Finland-Denmark-and-Sweden.html. Accessed April 17, 2017. 
38 Stoicescu. 
39 Ibid. 
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hold up against Russia’s, which makes the Baltics to rely on the EU.40 In this respect, a closer 
look at the EU as a security actor and its Common Security and Defense Policy is needed in 
order to find out if it is a credible and reliable security partner for the Baltic States.  
 
2. Security actorness and security architecture 
2.1. Security actorness 
 
The EU through its integration process have increased its capabilities to influence the external 
world, and in that sense, acquired some form of actorness in the international arena.41 Bretherton 
and Vogler define an actor as “an entity that exhibits a degree of autonomy from its external 
environment, and indeed from its internal constituents, and which is capable of volition or 
purpose”42. Sjöstedt was one of the first scholars who explained that the EU’s existence in the 
international system and its relationship with external environment defines it as an international 
actor. He introduced the notion of actorness as a capability to act consciously and actively in 
relation to other actors in the external world.43 In his words, an international actor contains 
features of delimitation from other actors, autonomy to make its own rules and laws, and 
possession of capabilities to act on the international arena.44 Similarly, Christopher Hill, a 
professor in international relations, defines criteria of actorness as a clear identity, autonomous 
decision making system, and competent and effective policies.45  
In the broad security field, such criteria as political autonomy, efficient policy, resources and 
operational activities, and the impact on the international security environment are major 
indicators of the EU’s actorness.46 According to Tardy, the development of the common security 
and defense policy and the EU’s- led operations under CSDP transformed the EU into a security 
                                                          
40 GLADYSH,  191. 
41 Anastasia Chebakova, "Theorizing the Eu as a Global Actor: A Constructivist Approach" (paper presented at 
the The Maturing European Union–ECSA-Canada Biennial Conference Paper, 2008), 5. 
42 Vogler and Bretherton. 
43 Gunnar Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community, Swedish Studies in International Relations: 7 
(Farnborough [Hants.] : Saxon house, 1977, 1977), Non-fiction, 16. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Christopher Hill, The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy, vol. Taylor & Francis e-Library ed (London: Routledge, 
2002), Book. 
46 Tardy, 28. 
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actor.47 On the other hand, other scholars argue that apart from the EU- led operations, the EU 
through its process of integration and representation of its liberal values, can still be defined as 
a security actor. Going back to the creation of the European Community, the main rationale 
behind it was to prevent any conflicts between France and Germany, which later became 
security community.48 The EU served as a stabilizing power after the Cold- War, later 
introduced enlargement policy which worked as a conflict prevention in a bigger area. 49 
According to Duchene, the EU’s role in the world is civilian power and he argued that the EU 
in its nature is a civilian actor.50 On the other hand, the creation of CSDP made the EU to move 
beyond the civilian power to a more dimensional actorness. Nonetheless, despite the creation of 
its military capabilities, Hill argues that the EU is promising too much while its capabilities are 
very limited. He referred it as “capability- expectation gap”.51 Due to this reason the EU’s 
influence as a security actor is weak, and in the eyes of other actors the EU is not recognized as 
equal or potential actor.   
From the point of view of realists, states are the dominant actors and they define security in 
“self- interested” terms.52 It is the states, especially the powerful ones, which set the rules for 
the other states based on their interests and cost- benefits calculations. The EU is not a sovereign 
actor, but it serves as a channel for the states to achieve their interests.53 Realists share the view 
that the CSDP is more an arena for gaining more power than making the EU a security actor.54 
Meanwhile, constructivism does not concentrate on material factors, but it concentrates on 
perceptions and meanings the relevant actors give to specific events and according to those 
meanings the actors decide to act or not. The EU is shaping events inside and outside its borders 
based on its own will or in response to the external actors’ expectations and demands. 55 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, vol. 62 (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
49 Tardy, 29. 
50 Duchêne. 
51 Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," Journal of 
Common Market Studies 31, no. 3 (1993): 309. 
52 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 1992, 392. 
53 Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer, Explaining the Eu's Common Security and Defence Policy. [Elektronisk 
Resurs] : Theory in Action, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 
2012), Non-fiction, 19. 
54 Sten Rynning, "Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies 49, 
no. 1 (2011): 36. 
55 Chebakova,  5. 
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According to Bretherton and Vogler, the concept of “actorness” can be divided into three areas: 
Presence, Opportunity and Capability. The Presence of the EU conceptualizes internal 
developments and external expectations. In other words, the EU’s presence in the international 
arena shapes perceptions and expectations of the third parties. The existence of the EU, its 
success or failures increase or decrease expectations of the third parties towards the EU’s 
actorness and significance.56 In general, the EU’s presence depends on internal solidarity and 
unity which leads to the concept of Capability- a capacity to respond effectively to the external 
opportunities and expectations of the third parties. Effectivity of such response depends on the 
states’ political willingness, shared priorities and solidarity to act collectively. Opportunity 
encapsulates ideas or interpretations of the events which can work as driving or inhibiting factors 
for the actions in the external environment.57 Mainly, the concept of capability is the result of 
presence and opportunity which refer to the EU’s ability to react to the specific situations which 
are brought forward by Presence and Opportunity.58 
Katarina Engberg, a practitioner who conceptualized the EU’s collective use of force, stated that 
the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy has provided the EU with a unique tool which 
is combined of military and civilian means. Through the CSDP the EU is able to face security 
challenges, to retain its power and influence in global system, to promote democratic peace and 
defend certain political interests. 59 
2.2. Security architecture 
 
The notion of European security is quite controversial and unclear. As Tardy states, the 
discussion about the concept of European Security is built around questions of what is to be 
secured: states, regions, institutions or individuals, by whom: NATO, UN, the EU or Member 
States, from what kind of threats and through what kind of instruments: military, diplomacy or 
civilian. Moreover, the big question is if European security encapsulates a geographic space or 
entity. The EU’s aspirations to become a security actor in the 1990s made it an object of security, 
in this respect, European security became referent to the security of the EU and its Member 
                                                          
56 Vogler and Bretherton, 24. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 29. 
59 Engberg,  1. 
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States rather than geographical space.60 Meanwhile, in parallel with the development of the EU’s 
security actorness, European security also embodied developments in regional security. Such 
developments are built around actors, threats, sources of threat and policy responses. Beyond 
the security of the EU as an entity and its Member States, issues like Russian foreign policy and 
its emerging threats, the roles of security institutions such as NATO or the UN belong to the 
European security spectrum. 61 
The EU through CSDP has become a security actor in crisis management and it develops 
relations with other security institutions such as the UN and NATO.  The EU within its security 
policy has become an option for crisis management operations as much as NATO or the UN.  
Such an interconnectivity between the security institutions forms EU- NATO- UN security 
triangle (see figure 1). As Xymena Kurowska, an IR theorist in policy analysis, explains, the 
development of the CSDP has triggered a reformulation of the roles regarding crisis 
management within the tringle of NATO- EU – UN.62 According to Tardy, the idea behind EU’s 
CSDP is about autonomy of decision and action in security matters. However, the EU’s 
dependency on the NATO’s assets brings the EU’s autonomy on question and makes any 
operation which requires significant military means almost impossible. 63 The EU’s relationship 
with the UN is built on collaboration where the EU is helping in peacekeeping when the UN 
capabilities are stretched and also assisting with the implementation of the UN activities. As a 
reward for such an assistance the UN provides the EU with legitimacy of goodness and 
significance as a security actor.64 Most of the EU’s missions have been done under the security 
umbrella of NATO or under mandate of the UN which makes the interconnectivity within this 
security triangle even stronger, and in that sense, less autonomous. The other security triangle 
which may be called a strategic security triangle is internal of the EU itself and consists of its 
major Member States: Germany, UK and France. These three Member States regarding their 
interests and culture shape the EU’s external policy and influence other Member States while 
setting new rules and new responsibilities. The EU’s operations through the CSDP have taken 
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form of a coalition between “the big three” and groups of smaller countries which found the EU 
to be a good channel for pursuing their own interests.65 Most of the EU’s missions could not be 
deployed without the support of these major Member States which proves that the EU’s 
dependency on such a strategic triangle is significant in making any decisions regarding 
deployments. Apart from their strategical interests, the “the big three” also helps to spread the 
EU’s values and enhance its visibility in the international environment which can be summed 
up in the context of Europeaness.  
 
Figure 1 The Security tringles, source: Author’s own figure. 
 
Russia’s foreign policy and a current example of the Ukrainian crisis referring to Russian 
aggression and illegal intervention in the country highlighted one more inter related triangle 
regarding security issues: Russia- the Baltic States-  and the Baltic Sea region. Moscow’s foreign 
policy discloses its strategic interests and historical identity in the Baltic Sea region and the 
Baltic States. The Baltic Sea region which encapsulates Sweden, Finland, The Baltic States, 
Poland, Denmark and Norway is geopolitically important to Putin as a strategic area for political 
and economic influence over the countries around the Baltic Sea. Russia sees the whole Baltic 
Sea region through the lens of physical control and political power. For Russia control of 
physical territory is a source of power which gives some kind of legitimate place in security- 
political constellation.66 Moreover, Russia still holds the bitter loss of previously occupied 
nations, the Baltic States, and their successful development in the region and membership of 
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NATO and the EU. 67Such a disappointment of loss is based on historical identity which projects 
an image of Russia as a major power, and which Russia intends to get back. In addition, Russia 
has fears that Sweden and Finland will join NATO which is perceived as a threat to the whole 
nation of Russia. Russia’s internal politics is based on confrontational logic which is built of 
enemy images. The image of aggressive West actions in Ukraine is used as an excuse for 
Russia’s activity in the country of Ukraine. 68 Such an image of enemies makes Moscow 
resentful and openly hostile towards the Baltic Sea region. Russia’s aggressive actions as a 
message of its power was already there before the Ukrainian crisis. It has violated the air and 
maritime space of Sweden, Finland and the Baltic States many times. For example, in October 
1981, the Soviet submarine hit an underwater rock close to Karlskrona in Sweden. As an 
explanation the Soviet navy issued doubtful statements saying that the submarine appeared in 
the Swedish waters due to some accident, however, the ship had not sent any distress signal.69 
Moreover, Russia’s military exercise in the region threatens all countries around the Sea. The 
latest military exercise included practice of invasion of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. 
Such a violation of air and maritime and Russia’s military operation in Crimea demonstrates its 
willingness to use military means in order to pursue its interests and regain its power. In this 
respect, the question is: what will be next? 
 
Figure 2 The triangle of security issue, source: Author’s own figure. 
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In recent years, tensions between Russia and the Baltic States have been triggered by historical 
events and symbols. One of the tensions started in 2007 when the Estonian government intended 
to relocate Soviet monument to the outskirts of the city of Tallinn. Such an intention evoked 
riots which involved Russian minorities, supported by the government of Russia. In addition, 
apart from riots, a three week wave of cyber-attacks hit Estonia. The similar story was found in 
Lithuania as well, when Lithuanian Parliament banned the display of Soviet Symbols. The Baltic 
States’ sense of security was weakened even more after the Russian- Georgian war in 2008 
which was based on Russia’s intentions to defend its citizens beyond its borders.70 Meanwhile, 
the current situation of Ukraine is one more signal that Russia is stretching its muscles even 
further and step by step it is destroying the peaceful European security architecture.  
While analyzing the EU as a security actor and its capabilities regarding crisis management, the 
case of the Ukrainian crisis and the EU’s response to it uncovers the EU’s willingness to 
prioritize soft power over hard power during tough and challenging times. Moreover, it reveals 
the importance of the strategic triangle of Germany, France and the UK which plays quite a role 
in the EU’s response. The EU’s soft response makes the Baltic States to worry even more 
because a possible threat to the Baltic States is just behind the wall and the question is if these 
states can trust the EU as a credible security actor in case of Russia’s aggressive actions towards 
the Baltic States.  
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1. The CSDP: historical background 
 
Prehistoric roots of the EU’s security and defense dimension go back to 1948 when after two 
devastating continental wars collective defense became the concern of Europe. In 1948 the 
Treaty of Brussels was signed by the UK, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
The Treaty obliged the five signatories to collective self- defense.71 On the other hand, other 
scholars declare that the beginning of common security matter started even earlier, in 1947 with 
a Treat of Dunkirk or the Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed by France and the 
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UK, which laid the foundation for the collective security and obligated the two countries to 
collaborate against any renewal threat of Germany.72 Next year the Treaty was expanded and 
became the Treaty of Brussels. However, after the creation of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 1949, as a main and significant defense organization, the Treaty of 
Brussels was set aside.73 In 1950 the idea of the European Defense Community (EDC) emerged 
as an initiative to build a supranational security body, as an ambitious political project to create 
a Common European Army. The EDC was proposed by the French Prime Minister Rene Pleven 
and was based on the “Pleven Plan” as a response to the USA proposal to access West Germany 
to NATO and, in this respect, increase the influence and defense capabilities in Europe and 
counterbalance the USSR. Due to this reason, the main idea and goal of the Pleven Plan was to 
create European Defense Community which would incorporate Common European Army and 
which would increase security in Europe against the USSR. The EDC had to serve for the same 
purposes as NATO, moreover, France was also seeking to keep an eye on Germany. However, 
the Treaty on European Defense Community was signed in 1952 by France, Italy, West 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, but, paradoxically, at the end was not 
ratified by France, which stated that this would negatively affect countries’ national sovereignty 
in the field of security and defense.74 On the other hand, after Germany and Italy joined NATO 
in 1955, the will to cooperate on defense continued and resulted with the arose of the Western 
European Union, which was designed to coordinate the defense policies of the seven countries- 
UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and Italy. The idea behind the 
Western European Union was to group members of the EU which were also members of NATO 
and serve as European organization responsible for collective defense.75 However, the WEU 
prevailed passive and mostly operated in the shadow of NATO and the NATO played a 
dominated role in supervising the defense and security of Europe and assured its collective 
functionality.76 Later its activities were transferred to the EU and it was declared defunct in 
2011, June.77 Most of Europe’s attempts to increase its security and defense capabilities 
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struggled over time and one of the most significant reason for this was the positions of France 
and the UK. For 50 years, the UK and France delayed any European attempt for cooperation on 
security issues due to their perceptions of security and relations to NATO. The UK argued that 
if Europe portrayed an ability to self -security, then it would affect the relations with Washington 
which could lead to isolation. Moreover, the UK believed that Europe was not capable in 
building its autonomous defense system. On the other hand, France assumed that the US would 
take Europe even more seriously, if it took itself more seriously, which could lead to a better 
cooperation. However, these aspirations of France and the UK were mostly based on speculation 
rather than strategic analysis. 78 
1970s can be called one of the first serious steps towards European foreign policy with the 
establishment of the European Political Co- operation (EPC) which had to serve as a channel 
for member states to discuss and adjust their positions and act accordingly. In general, EPC 
worked as a consultative body and brought member states to a closer cooperation. What is more, 
the EPC highlighted and defined a common identity and its role as an active actor on the world 
stage.79  
In the late 1980s the architecture and consideration of the security matters gained a completely 
different picture. The breakdown of Communism and the end of the Cold War between two 
different poles evoked the need for a wider and clearer concept of security.80 In this respect, the 
Treaty on European Union in 1992 marked one of the first serious attempts to illuminate the 
concept of security. The Treaty transformed the EPC into the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP).81 This new project of the CFSP was mostly driven by France and Germany in 
the background. France as a ruler of European politics and Germany as an accountable body for 
economic and monetary policies. After the new project was put on work, the greater leadership 
over both policy areas was improved. 82 It seemed that the birth of the CFSP marked a new page 
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of peace and democracy.83 However, the creation of CFSP was being initiated at almost the 
same time when Yugoslavia was falling apart, and war, which seemed was over and the peace 
took over the world order, did not disappear with the fall of the Berlin Wall. 84 With the end of 
the Cold War Europe’s place in the security environment changed essentially. Throughout the 
Cold War, Europe was divided by two dominated poles- the United States and the Soviet Union. 
At that time the US was seeking security and stability in Western Europe, while the Soviet 
Union was aiming to have a compliant Eastern and Central Europe. In this matter, there existed 
two security superpowers that mattered at that time- NATO and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization. Due to this reason, it is believed that the plan of the European Defense 
Community was not ratified because there was no need to develop hard security means as it was 
a duty of alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.85 However, with the end 
of the Cold War, this bipolarity of security providers disappeared and Europe changed its status 
from security consumer to security provider. 86 In this respect, with the shift of the status of 
security, Brussels desired to play a peacemaker role in the Balkans and increase its presence and 
activity as a security actor. However, violence in former Yugoslavia and Brussels’ failure to 
stop slaughter in Croatia and Bosnia was already a triggering message of the EU’s capabilities 
and efficiency as a security provider. In addition, the actions taken in the Balkans were lacking 
professional armed forces, had no common strategic culture and had no abilities to deploy 
sufficient forces abroad.87 The wars in the Balkans was a challenge to Europe as it was too big, 
too soon to handle and it exceeded European political and diplomatic capabilities. 88 
Another step in strengthening the CFSP was Petersberg Tasks, containing a list of military and 
security priorities, which included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and 
peacemaking, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management which lead to a more coherent 
security policy with clearer Common Strategies of the Union.89 After Amsterdam Treaty 
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adopted Petersberg Tasks in 1997, theoretically, the EU became a military actor. 90 In general, 
many of the Union’s elites were collectively already agreeing on developing and improving 
their role in the new post- cold war security arena by building up their military capacity and 
moving towards more autonomous European security system91. In this respect, the European 
Security and Defense Identity was born, which had to allow European forces to use American 
military assets via NATO, but just in those situations where the US had very little or no interest 
at all. ESDI had to serve in situations like the Bosnian war, then the EU intended to deploy 
military assets, but had no possibilities in doing this because the US did not show any interest 
and need to be involved. However, as Howorth stated, that this arrangement was nothing else as 
“separable but not separate”.92 Member States did not find themselves in a military response 
after the Cold War and Union’s contribution to the European security environment was mostly 
symbolic and driven by democratization and the liberalization of the market rather than military 
operations. The Union’s power was constructed in promoting non- military aspects of security 
instead of military ones. 93 
A dramatic change was initiated by the French and British government in 1998- The Saint- Malo 
declaration, which gave a totally new start for a more efficient European Security and Defense 
Policy.94 One of the main reasons for the declaration was a new crisis in Kosovo, which triggered 
Franco- British concerns about the need for the EU military capacity.95 The declaration stated 
that the EU should have more autonomous space in its security and defense matters, 
independently forming its own policy without intervention of the USA which would lead to the 
development of the EU as a security actor. Moreover, the Declaration called for new institutions 
which would allow to develop and implement the policy and demanded credible military forces 
which could be deployed then is decided. These new approaches towards security and defense 
was named the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP), which was separated 
from ESDI due to its new capabilities of decision- making and autonomy. However, due to the 
long acronymic abbreviation, CESDP became the European Security and Defense Policy 
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(ESDP), which after 2009 Lisbon Treaty became the Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP). 96  
The next step towards a military and civilian capabilities of the EU as a security actor was made 
at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, which also marked the continuation of Europe’s 
collective thinking. It was agreed to establish a rapid reaction force (RRF) which would be able 
to deploy 60 000 troops within 60 days for at least one year by the year of 2003. However, even 
after Helsinki summit, the EU desire to develop its military capabilities were controversial as 
countries like Sweden and Finland were more in favor of civilian instruments over militarization 
and intended the EU to play a more constructive role in peacebuilding.97 In 2004 the initiative 
by Germany, France and the UK to set up small and mobile fighting units which would engage 
in military crisis prevention was also a step towards the implementation of the EU’s CSDP. The 
Battlegroups consist of multinational units of about 1500 soldiers that can be deployed within 5 
days and stay in operations up to 120 days. A battle group is accounted to be the smallest military 
body which could be deployed for operations and missions.  As the Secretary General of NATO, 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, once said that the purpose of the EU Battle Groups is to be in the war 
and we should not think about the EU as a soft power and the NATO as a hard power. 98 
However, the EU’s Battle Groups were declared in 2007, none of them have ever been 
deployed.99 Apart from military aspect, the civilian crisis management concept was introduced 
in 1999 at the Helsinki European Council meeting. At that time, it was seen as a complement to 
the military capacities of the EU.  The aim was to prove that Europe is ready and credible to 
work within civilian crisis as well. The introduction of civilian instruments which were very 
welcomed by less military inclined countries resulted in a mixture of civilian and military 
aspects of the CSDP.100 
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A long way has already been taken to enhance the Union’s capacity of autonomous security or 
something that is close to it. This way was marked with a number of factors contributing to the 
Union’s security architecture: the rebirth of Europe after the Cold World, the changes of 
geopolitical order which witnessed a diminished American will to be a security provider for 
Europe and lowered interests in Europe as a continent than it was during the Cold War. In 
addition, many Member States of the Union were seeking to declare the EU’s capabilities to 
become a complete security actor on a world stage. 101 Moreover, new conflicts were emerging 
and Europe needed new tools and new strategies to combat these issues: “the era when European 
security was synonymous with NATO had gone”. 102 
3.2. The CSDP in crisis management 
 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, a former American politician and soldier, said: “What counts is not 
necessarily the size of the dog in the fight- it’s the size of the fight in the dog.” This could be 
applied for the analysis of the CSDP, as the best way to understand it, is not through the 
examination of its capacity and institutions, but through the analysis of what it does and how.103 
The EU through the CSDP executes military and civilian operations which are the means for 
crisis management and conflict prevention.  Those military and civilian operations which are 
deployed, can be called the core features of the CSDP. While executing military or civilian 
deployments, the EU channels its commitment to the treaty, turns its vision into action, reflects 
its identity and culture. Moreover, the operations represent the EU’s inquire to find a place on 
the world stage.104 In this respect, a closer look to other scholars’ analysis of some of the CSDP 
operations is more revealing than just analysis of its capabilities per se. 105  
The EU has already deployed the missions in different geographical zones- the Balkans, Africa, 
Asia, Middle Est, Europe. Those missions and operations include civil or military measures in 
the framework of the CSDP. Some of those missions are already completed, some of them are 
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still ongoing, some of them incorporating executive mandate or some of them providing 
monitoring, mentoring or advising frameworks. 106 Up until now, the EU launched 34 missions, 
where 19 out of 34 missions are completed and 15 are still ongoing. 107 At the very beginning, 
the first missions were military missions, which gave an impression that the EU was becoming 
a military actor. Moreover, in 2004 the EU launched its biggest ever military mission- EUFOR- 
Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it was argued that the militarily active operations 
in the very beginning were launched in order to enhance visibility and significance of the 
CSDP.108 However, after a decade of civilian missions, security experts, Korski and Gowan, 
assumed that the civilian missions under the CSDP is largely illusionary and worthless due to 
the EU’s disability to find civilians who would participate in the missions. Moreover, they stated 
that most of the EU’s missions are irrelevant, remain small and lacking ambition.109  
In 2003 the EU deployed its first military operation in Macedonia, named Concordia. The main 
aim of the mission was to help to keep the secure environment and keep the peace. The EU 
deployed 137 troops from all member states except Ireland and Denmark. However, as Jolyon 
Howorth, a professor of European politics at the University of Bath, states, that the mission was 
“high in political symbolism and modest in terms of military”, which was mostly used for the 
EU to test its abilities and practical implementation of the military mission. Moreover, the 
NATO remained in the background of the mission, as the mission was based on the Berlin Plus 
agreement, which means that the EU relied on NATO assets.110 The same year the EU launched 
the second military operation, which was fully autonomous and outside Europe- EUFOR 
Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The mission was launched after the call of UN 
which could not provide sufficient security in the area. The mission’s intention was to stabilize 
security in the area, develop humanitarian environment, and protect UN personnel and airports. 
EUFOR Artemis was mostly driven by France, which managed to deploy 500 troops in Bunia 
the next day after the decision to launch the mission was made. This proves a good preparation, 
but also reveals French interests to restore its influence in its former colony. In general, the 
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mission uncovers two strategic preferences of France: to bring its influence back in Africa and 
put the flesh on European military dimension as an autonomous actor. However, the other major 
actor, Germany, did not have very strong strategic interests in the region, but its involvement in 
the mission was driven by its foreign policy goals: demonstration of European togetherness, 
support for UN and spread humanitarian values. 111 The operation Artemis can reveal European 
Security Culture. The commitments to St. Malo declaration made it impossible for the MS not 
to support the mission or to “adopt a no action position”. Moreover, the mission Artemis was 
about building and shaping the EU’s global image and strengthening the security and defense 
policy.112 However, Peter Schmidt, argues that not all member states accepted taking part in the 
operation even though they did not oppose it, there existed different understandings between the 
MS of situations where to intervene militarily. In this respect, the author draws the conclusion 
that the EU is lacking common security strategy and most of the decisions are influenced by 
countries’ national security cultures and norms. The mission Artemis was mostly based on 
French interests and country’s security strategic culture rather than it was based on a common 
European strategic culture and countries agreement to support the mission but do not contribute 
to it, does not reveal the European Security Culture.113 What is more, the critics argued that the 
mission was too limited in time and space and not sufficient. The mission could be defined as 
an experiment and as a politico- military collaboration in the EU from which lessons could be 
learnt and used for broader CSDP (ESDP at that time).114 
The third military operation, which took place in Bosnia – Herzegovina in December 2004 
(EUFOR Althea), is defined as the most ambitious military operation. The operation was 
transferred from NATO to the EU and had to contribute to a safe and secure environment in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the perspective of the EU, the operation was a channel for a 
broader EU policy towards Balkans, which had to serve for the future membership. However, 
the mission was criticized for being more civilian than militaristic and consisted of four 
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elements: economy, rule of law, police and defense reform. As Howorth states, a mission which 
started as a military mission was transformed into a mix of civil- military operation.115 
In June 2006, the fourth military mission was launched in Congo, named EUFOR RD and lasted 
until November 2006. The EU was asked by the UN to deploy a military operation to the DRC 
and assist the UN mission (MONUC) and if needed deploy a quick and immediate reaction 
forces during the process of the presidential elections in the country. Even though the UN asked 
for assistance in 2005 December, but just in 2006 March the EU agreed to support and deploy 
troops. Apart from being lengthy in a decision making, the EU struggled in finding troops, as 
the only member states who had the military capabilities and were able to execute military 
operation in Africa were Germany, the UK and France. However, the UK was not keen on taking 
a role because it was already busy with Iraq and Afghanistan. France was leading the operation 
Artemis and insisted on the other country to lead this time. Even though Germany was very 
reluctant to take a lead, but eventually accepted the lead role. 116 However, the mission received 
a lot of criticism. First, the size of the force was symbolic comparing to the size of the country 
and that the elections were nationwide. Second, the troops were deployed in a city which was 
the least risky- Kinshasa, while the most of troubles were likely to occur in other cities (mostly 
in the Eastern part). Third, the length of the mission was just four months and had to end at the 
time, when the troubles might occur and the need of the troops might be needed the most. 
Howorth in his book states that the mission was described as “cut and run”. 117 On the other 
hand, the elections took place without any serious incidents and the mission was marked as a 
success story and had to serve as a good image for the EU.  
2014 April, the EU launched a military operation EUFOR RCA which had to support the UN in 
providing safe and secure environment in Bangui (Central African Republic) and was launched 
until the March 2015. This mission revealed some kind of a paradox between the Member States. 
On one hand, the Member States agreed on the military deployment, but on the other hand, most 
of the Member States were unwilling to contribute to the operation. This paradox was called 
intentions- reality gap. Due to the emergency in the country and the need for the EU to intervene 
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and assist the UN, the Member States approved the deployment due to a sense of collective 
obligation because deployment was considered as the right thing to do. However, most of the 
Member States had no interests in the region and were more concentrated on other issues, like 
Ukraine, they were unwilling to make contributions to the mission. In this case, those Member 
States contributed very symbolically and left the operation to be led by France, which had an 
interest in the region.118 The actions which are made by the Member States are influenced by 
sense of obligations and roles, but also by various historical backgrounds, political and 
economic factors, identity and cultural aspects and in different crisis countries may have 
different interests and different ways of acting or influencing.  
Apart from deploying military missions, the EU under CSDP can deploy non-military missions 
as well. These mission can include police missions in post- conflict or crisis management 
situation, monitoring and assistance missions and rule of law missions.  
One of the police missions which is referred as is one of the most important and challenging 
missions is EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was launched in 2003 and completed in 
2012. The goal of the mission was to establish a sustainable and publicly accountable police 
service which would operate according to European standards and which had to help to fight 
organized crime in the country. 119The mission has some credits in the development of CSDP, 
as the mission was long it served as an experiment with the outcome of learning by doing. 
Moreover, the mission worked as a channel for introducing European norms and values.120 The 
mission was criticized for the lack of political will to address the problems and the EU struggle 
to understand the role of the mission in post- conflict situations. Moreover, the police mission 
was used to channel the EU’s values which had to be embraced by the country. In this respect, 
the police lost its functionality.121  
Another experimental mission was rule of law mission in Georgia between 2004 and 2005. The 
mission was named EUJUST Themis and was the first rule of law mission. The aim of the 
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mission was to reform Georgian criminal legislation. Notwithstanding the success of the 
mission, the EU demonstrated unwillingness to be involved too much in the Georgian legislation 
system due to several reasons. First, the EU was frightened of the reaction of Russia and second, 
intended to remote a possible Georgian membership into the EU. 122 
A short analysis of some of the missions above revealed problematic and challenging factors 
under the missions of the CSDP. Most of the missions were criticized for being too small, 
lacking of consensus between member states, too short, insufficient, lengthy in decision making, 
driven by countries’ interests and different cultures. Moreover, the most of the missions served 
as a learning ground and was an instrument to channel the EU’s norms and values and was 
driven due to obligations to do good and right.  
 
3.3. Explaining the EU under CSDP 
 
An impressive number of CSDP missions and operations has been launched, however the 
achievements are weak and most of the missions were relatively of a small scale and 
unambitious. 123 Moreover, the amount of the CSDP’s operations consists mostly of civilian 
operations and most of the missions did not involve the force deployments or if there were any 
military deployments they were small and for very limited period of time.124 While following 
the critical evaluations of the missions, quite a bulk of the studies confirm that the operations 
under CSDP did not contribute in solving serious defense issues. On top of that, the CSDP 
remains quite passive, while serious crises show a clear threat to European values and 
interests.125 As Howorth states: “even after twenty years of preparation, the EU’s capacity to 
mount a significant military mission in its own backyard is grossly inadequate.” 126 
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One important observation was made by Hills, who argued that the EU projects capability- 
expectations gap while giving big expectations about its actions towards security and defense, 
but its capabilities to fulfill these promises stay insufficient. 127 Despite of good intentions, new 
strategies, new tools which were introduced after almost every European Council, the capability 
expectations gap were increasing and was leading to a questions “why are not we able to 
intervene?”128 As Frederic Charillon, a professor of International Relations, remarked: “the 
capability expectations gap remains as an important lacuna in the approach to European 
security”. 129 
An important study is made by Katarina Engberg who attempts to answer the question under 
what conditions the EU decides to intervene militarily. The author came up with few 
conclusions. First, the CSDP missions will be more likely launched in those situations then the 
agreement with local influential actors can be reached (EUFOR RDC). In other cases, if this 
factor can not be achieved, the missions is less likely to be launched (Lebanon). Second, the EU 
will undertake military mission in the cases which can provide an opportunity rather than a 
challenge. In other words, if the situation contains high risk, the mission will be less likely 
launched. Moreover, the author also concluded that the missions are more likely to be launched 
in former colonies of the main EU Member States or if the other security organizations are 
involved. The EU tends to be involved in those missions where it can play a complementary 
role with other security organizations (NATO or UN). Engberg summarizes that the EU military 
missions are reluctant, small scale, very conditional on reaching a positive outcome and 
opportunity.130 
There is a story written by Donald Puchala about blind men and an elephant. Some blind men 
were exploring an elephant and each of them touched the elephant in order to find out how the 
beast looked like. All men came up with different conclusions how the animal looked like, 
because every man touched different part of the elephant and made different assumptions 
according to the part they touched. The result was that none of the man got a clear picture of 
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how the animal looked like, but each men believed their own experience which made them 
disbelieve the experience of others which led to a discussion about the nature of the beast. 131 
The same can be seen in the case of the EU. “There is a contradiction between the EU presenting 
itself as a force for good- including the universal good- and endowing itself with a military 
capacity”.132 The EU seeks to be good and do what it considers to be appropriate and right to 
do, on the other hand, still desires to be a military power. However, the EU applies diplomatic 
and civilian means to far more countries in trouble than it has used military means. The EU 
missions through the CSDP can be called small do good adventures, as the EU chooses the 
operations which are low at risks, require little force and small amount of professional military 
component. 133As Alyson Bailes, a British diplomat, political scientist, academic and polyglot, 
noted, the EU is a nice cop which is made up of friendly and safe characteristics. The rationale 
behind the choices of the missions lies not in the situations which require the most of 
humanitarian aid or which would provide the biggest benefit to more actors, but it lies in the 
calculations of low risk and costs, learning value, an easily reachable consensus between the 
Member States and the possibility to “show up” on a stage. 134 Moreover, the author makes some 
remarks which are complementary to Engberg’s conclusions. The EU favors the missions which 
are close to home or which are based in former colonial areas (Congo). On top of that, the 
support from the locals is also a critical factor.135 However, there are no clear guidelines which 
would define what sort of force should be used under what kind of circumstances. In this respect, 
different countries’ attitudes or cultures start to play a role. As some countries do not support 
missions which are high risk or missions that includes peace enforcement, while others support 
the missions that are urgent, but brings some advantages. In general, not all Member States has 
the same perception about the missions. Moreover, each country’s troops have different training 
experience which may lead to an incident which would infringe the image of the EU, norms and 
solidarity. The EU functions under the strategy of “doing good” through active, visible 
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interventions and through “being good” which is the nature of the EU, the foundation of peace 
and generosity, diffusing existential value to the world. 136 
Sven Biscop concluded that the EU’s Common Foreign and Security policy exists to do “good” 
in the world. “The EU as Snow White, pure, innocent- and helpless”.137 The separation of what 
is good and bad is one of the burdens towards the strength of the EU. Foreign policy is about 
the promotion of interests which, in general, is neither good nor bad. And the EU should 
understand, that sometimes “good” requires the use of force. In hard situations, like war crimes, 
genocide or ethnic cleansing, civilian power is powerless. If the Union is reluctant to use force 
under its own flag, then there are no chances for a credible collective action, especially in the 
eyes of those member states which have a strong strategic culture.138 The EU struggles with 
setting its clear objectives and evaluation of effectiveness of the missions. In contrary, the EU 
allocates more money without reassessing the instruments and expects different results, as 
Biscop calls it as “handing out free apples” and being good and generous. The desire to be good 
to everyone and being liked by everyone- that is the model of Snow White. On top of that, the 
Member States are too much focused on their interests and are not willing to let the EU play its 
full role. Biscop admits with Bailes’s statement, that the opinion of the Member States how to 
deal with the threat differs essentially which leads to three cases: arming, supporting or taking 
a safe seat. However, London and Paris have the most to say and influence the actions of the 
EU, while the other Member States can decide whether to join or not.139 In addition to Biscop 
notes, other scholars agrees on the divergence of the Member States understandings about the 
means and ends of security policy. The lack of consensus portrays the lack of security culture 
or reflects the extent of different national security cultures which influence the outcome of the 
EU security and defense policy.140 On the other hand, most Member States agree that military 
component is a need for the EU in order to increase its influence on a stage. However, the 
Member States are aware of the contradiction between the military power and the image of the 
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EU, its ideas, norms and values.141 Through the CSDP, the EU portrays an image of itself that 
is an altruistic, ethical, civil power and force for good. 142 On the other hand, the military 
missions which were discussed above, proves, that the EU has, though small scale, military 
means, however, the EU tends to close its eyes then it comes to deploy those means. Like in the 
famous story “Silver Blaze” by Sherlock Holmes about the dog that didn’t bark during the night 
when the crime occurred, the EU is likely to embrace soft and low profile in dealing with the 
crisis. 143 
3.4. Realism and Constructivism as explanatory frameworks 
 
In the following subchapter the IR theories of Realism and Constructivism is going to be 
described and examined in order to be applied as an explanatory approach for the raised 
questions in this thesis. Despite the fact that, according to other scholars, the operations under 
the CSDP are small scale, lack of ambition and low intensity, it has incited quite a bulk of 
theoretical literature which tries to explain the nature, factors, the scope and ambitions of the 
CSDP. The two IR theories, Realism and Constructivism, are chosen because they supplement 
and validate the arguments which were stated above and help in explaining the rationale behind 
the missions of the CSDP. Moreover, the material and ideational factors are interrelated in the 
realm of Security and Defense Policy. 144 
3.4.1. Realism 
 
Realism is a state centric approach which assumes that world politics consists of an international 
nexus of states, which concentrate on their own sovereignty and security. Realists draw attention 
to the national interests and the importance of the states’ survival. Realism is built around the 
core concepts “egoism” and “power centrism”. Moreover, realists states that everything in the 
world is measurable and material. 145 The realists analyses the EU not as autonomous actor, but 
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as a body where separate member states interact and the EU acts as a vehicle for the collective 
interests of the Member States.146 The theory explains that the material interests are the driving 
forces under the emergence of the CSDP and the decisions are based on cost- benefit 
calculations where the strongest states will carry the costs only in those cases which can 
strengthen their influence. In this respect, the strongest countries can shape and influence the 
external environment according to their interests.147 Realism states that the CSDP is a power 
project but a very fragile one as it projects nation- state power more than it reflects Europe’s 
power into the world.148 The CSDP is “shaped and moulded by European people responding to 
their own desires and ambitions”.149 According to Hoffmann, domestic differences, pluralist 
history and culture and diverging world views result in diverging foreign policy priorities.150 
Due to this complexity, the CSDP is about domestic European affairs and the biggest Member 
States support the EU as they would be likely worse off without it. 151 In terms of cooperation 
between the Member States, Realism argues that cooperation will occur only if there is an 
interests of the states to cooperate.152 However, the EU cooperation on milieu- shaping is 
primarily driven by the EU’s largest powers. 153 
There are two sub- schools of realism- minimal and maximal realists, which can explain 
different positions on when a state should intervene in a conflict.154 According to Catherine 
Gegout, a Professor in International Relations, the labelling depends on the extent the State is 
willing to intervene. The Minimal Realists theory expects the EU not to intervene in the Third 
World, it should act as “neo- isolationists” and any intervention would lead to creating more 
enemies. On the other hand, maximal realists states that the EU would intervene if this 
intervention would enhance their power and leadership and if limited risks are at stake. Gegout 
made a conclusion that the EU during its first military mission was more likely to adopt maximal 
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realists approach. Maximal Realists argue that there are five possible conditions which can 
influence a possible intervention in a third country: the host country is small and militarily weak, 
the intervention is supported by the population, the costs of the intervention is low and the 
possibility of success is high.155 In addition to this, Gegout argues that the EU is more likely to 
intervene then the warring area is of strategic and economic importance, and at a low cost of 
military means.  However, the EU does not have the capacity to intervene in a large scale 
operations and if there is such a decision, then it comes not as a reaction to a crisis but it mostly 
originates from a will to promote the EU’s own image. 156  
However, as Sten Rynning, a professor of International Relations, states that realism is quite a 
diverse approach. Another school of realism is structural realism which distinguishes two sub 
groups of realism: offensive and defensive realism. Offensive realism is about maximization of 
power. In order to be safe, the states will seek to maximize their power relative to others, which 
may include a degree of aggressiveness towards the Great Powers. Domination and hegemony 
is the best strategy according to offensive relists. On the other hand, Defensive realism advice 
the states to prepare for war in order to avoid it. In contrast to Offensive realism, Defensive 
realism states that domination is a dangerous strategy and emphasize the balance of power. The 
nation states are perceived as security maximizers and power is just a mean of security.157 The 
main difference between offensive and defensive relists is that, in case of defensive realism, the 
states seek to accumulate adequate amount of power in order to ensure their own security. 
However, in case of offensive realism the States seek to accumulate more power to become a 
global power. 158 On the other hand, for long periods, states tend to apply more a defensive 
approach rather than power maximization, the latter would be applied if the benefits outweigh 
the costs. 159 
On the other hand, every sub school of realists agree that egoism, self- interest and states 
priorities to self- security are key drivers. In this respect, the EU member states will tend to safe 
guard their sovereignty and to pursue their foreign security policy priorities and, in this respect, 
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the CSDP will be driven by the biggest Member States and will remain as an intergovernmental 
body.160   
3.4.2. Constructivism 
 
Constructivism rose in 1980s as a contrast to the traditional rational- based theories and draws 
the attention to “norms, identities and cultures”.161 In general, the idea of constructivism is 
embedded in norms and identities, social construction of reality which influence the way the 
states act. According to Martha Finnemore, a constructivist scholar of international relations: 
“beliefs about legitimate intervention constitute certain behavioral possibilities, and, in that 
sense, cause them”. In this respect, constructivism seeks to answer the question “how” instead 
of “why”.162 In addition, Wendt stated: “a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory 
is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the 
objects have for them”. The author concludes that the States act differently towards an enemy 
and towards a friend because the understanding of an enemy is threatening, which is the opposite 
of a friend.163 Which refers to the explanation why the same events have different meanings to 
different actors. As author exemplifies, that the military power of the USA has different 
meanings to Canada and to Cuba or British missiles have a different significance to the USA 
than do Soviet missiles.164  
In contrast to realist thinking, constructivism declare that different interacting actors do not 
perceive one goal which is about gaining more power, but the actors make choices based on 
their identities, norms and cultures which bring realities into being. The theory underlines the 
importance of ideas and identities and how these factors influence and shape the understanding 
and response of the states to the specific events. According to Wendt, actors acquire identities 
which is socially constructed, stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self. 
Therefore, social construction of identities lead to roles and responsibilities of the actors. 165 As 
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Christoph Meyer, a Professor of European and International politics, states, then the problem or 
opportunity occur, the actors do not start with a blank sheet, but decide on appropriate behavior 
towards the problem or opportunity based on pre- existing beliefs, ideas and norms. 166 In 
general, Constructivists consider the actors or agents as role players who behave in a situation 
according to their understandings of what is appropriate to do. States or actors follow the norms 
which leads to the “logic of appropriateness” considering any given situation. 167 
Taking into account the characteristics of constructivism and referring it to security matters, 
constructivism is concerned about the impacts of norms, identities, images, roles and strategic 
cultures in international security. “Norms within the concept of strategic culture can be 
conceptualized as beliefs about what is appropriate, legitimate, or just regarding the goals and 
modalities concerning the use of force”. As Meyer noted, the norms or “logic of 
appropriateness” is not just about doing right, but also thinking what works in security and 
defense affairs.168 Constructivism as a theory was widely used in explaining CSDP, because 
roles, rules, identities and ideas are perceived as tools which can provide with a wider and deeper 
insights of the EU’s drama in CSDP. 169 Henrik Larsen in his study analyzes why the EU made 
so little use of its military means. The author bases his arguments on constructivism and explains 
that the EU constructs itself as a civilian power based on political and economic interests and 
its regional interests in its policies downplayed the use of military means. Even though after the 
St. Malo declaration, the Member States believed that the EU’s acquisition of military means 
was a crucial factor in shaping and strengthening the EU’s image and power, the military means 
is still perceived as a part of its civilian means, just one of the Union’s tools. Military power is 
understood as a value added mean to the EU’s image which together strengthens the EU’s 
identity and the EU’s military access is a central factor for its prestige and the EU’s definition 
of itself as an important international actor. Moreover, the ability to use military tools 
demonstrates the EU’s ability to solve international conflicts and take more responsibility. 
However, apart from being just an integral part of civilian means, military means are presented 
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as means of last resort and civilian power as a dominant power. The author in his discourse 
analysis argues, that the EU’s possibility to draw military means as an integral part of a broader 
range of tools, makes it a unique actor in the international stage and enhance its image not just 
as a normal great power but as a unique one. The EU’s increasing actorness influence world 
affairs and promote its own values. Areas around Europe regarding security concerns are 
priorities of the EU. In those areas the EU has special priorities and responsibility in furthering 
the European values (The Balkans).170 According to constructivists approach the EU place its 
external image as a very important factor in the international arena, as well as its roles and 
responsibilities in a given situation influence the way other actors views the EU and perceives 
its importance as an actor. The missions under the CSDP gives an opportunity for the EU to 
increase its scope of actions, spread the EU’s values and enhance the EU’s visibility on the 
world stage. 171  
In addition to roles, responsibilities and images at the EU level, constructivists draw attention 
to differences between the Member States. Those differences in terms of their foreign policy 
traditions, identities and cultures shapes the preferences towards the use of force which together 
influence the outcome and development of the EU’s security and defense framework. 172 
According to Meyer, the preferences towards the use of force are encapsulated in the strategic 
culture which may differ between the Member States. Strategic culture consists of “the socially 
transmitted, identity derived norms, ideas, and habits that are shared among the most influential 
actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set 
of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defense goals”. 173 Strategic culture can be 
characterized by four dimensions. First dimension considers the goals for the use of force. For 
example, countries like Finland or Ireland consider the use of force in a very urgent situations 
and just in cases of the attacks on the home territory, but not for securing and defensing foreign 
people against threats abroad and not for promoting and securing the EU’s values and beliefs. 
On the other hand, countries like France and Britain are quite supportive of using force to defend 
the EU’s values and norms. The other dimension considers the way in which force is used. For 
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example, some states like Austria, tends to avoid force and use it as a last resort, which leads to 
minimizing the risk of causing death among foreign and own citizens. The third dimension is 
conditioned by beliefs about how the state should survive, whether it should join alliances and 
supranational organizations or this step would cause a danger for the state. Lastly, the dimension 
under which national governments require domestic or supranational organizations 
authorization of the use of force.  On one side of the spectrum is Germany, which requires a 
high degree of authorization and on the other side of the spectrum is France, which do not 
demand such a high degree of authorization.174 Christoph Meyer stated that one of the biggest 
drawbacks of the CSDP is the lack of consensus between the Member States on the use of force, 
which impedes the CSDP to use its full potential and to act in high intensity operations.175 
According to Howorth, there exists differences between the Member States which favor power 
projection and military means over civilian instruments and territorial defense, and those 
differences are the biggest burdens towards a common approach.176 On the other hand, other 
authors argue that there is a common agreement between the Member States to use civilian over 
military instruments which can be an indicator of an increasing convergence of the cultures 
amongst the Member States. 177 
In general, Constructivists, while explaining the small scale, modest and lack of ambition CSDP 
operations, would indicate the diverging norms of the Member States on the use of force as one 
of the main factors which affects the accountability and effectiveness of the CSDP. In other 
words, constructivists would point to the absence of a common European security culture.178  
The important characteristics of roles, responsibilities and images of the EU and differences 
between the strategic cultures of the Member States will be used in the analysis of this research.  
4. Methodology 
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4.1. A case study  
 
This chapter presents the methodological approach which is applied to answer the research 
question. The overall framework of the research is based on the analysis of the Ukrainian crisis 
and possible threats to the Baltic States from the side of Russia. In this respect, two case studies 
stands as a foundation for a deeper analysis of the research. A case study is a research strategy 
which is based on the analysis of one, or a small number, of phenomena. The word “case” 
derived from the Latin word casus, which means incidence, occurrence, happening, usually with 
unfavorable implications like an accident or misfortune.179 A case study gives some freedom, 
because it is not spatially delimited and it does not have to be contemporary, it can also be from 
the past. Moreover, the data for the case study may be collected in various ways, it can be both 
qualitative and quantitative. A case study can also serve in different ways. It can serve as a 
channel to develop and evaluate theories, formulate hypothesis or explain a particular 
phenomenon.180  
In the case of this thesis, the research will be conducted while analyzing the EU’s CSDP soft 
actorness and influence in the case of Ukraine and its capabilities in helping the Baltic States 
regarding a possible threat from Russia. Both case studies will be based on theoretical 
framework which will provide the explanations of problematics regarding the CSDP. A case 
study based on theoretical framework which seeks to provide an explanation for the 
phenomenon, is named as interpretative case study.181 However, one of the main challenges the 
case study can face is theory based. A case study is based on theoretical framework which has 
to serve for the study as a guide, but, according to Pascal Vennesson, a professor of political 
science, there is a danger that the author chooses unsuited theory for the research.182 In order to 
avoid this issue, the theoretical framework which is chosen for the empirical analysis is based 
on the previous literature and other scholars’ analysis of the prospects of the CSDP. What is 
more, the research is analyzed through the lenses of two different theories- Realism and 
Constructivism- in order to get a clearer and deeper picture of the problematical question. In 
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addition, apart from theoretical challenge, the other challenge has to do with cognitive biases, 
like confirmation biases then the research might seek information, which confirm the his or her 
beliefs, while information which contradicts with those beliefs is missed out. 183 Due to this 
reason the research will also be based on the survey which will provide the analysis with a wider 
range of opinions.  
4.2. Survey 
 
A case study of possible Russia’s threat to the Baltics and the EU’s actorness in the region is a 
case which is based on current events, historical experiences, academic arguments and 
discussions which especially sparked after the Ukrainian crisis. While evaluating the situation, 
it is necessary to analyze how the Baltic States evaluate such a problematic issue. In this respect 
the survey is conducted as a research tool to reveal and investigate opinions and thoughts about 
this issue. Moreover, the survey is capable to collect unbiased data from which reliable 
conclusions can be made. The target group of the survey is high officials, diplomats, politicians, 
professors or lecturers from the Baltic States who have specific and authoritative knowledge 
about the subject and are able to evaluate the situation in an objective way (later in the text the 
whole sample is simply named as “officials”). The sample includes 50 officials who are working 
at the embassies, ministries or defense forces and professors and lecturers from the Baltic 
Defense College. Such a sample is chosen due to the complexity of the topic which requires 
more knowledge and understanding. Moreover, as the selected sample is nationals from the 
Baltic States, it will provide with the opinion which is based on real facts and may differ from 
those who are not from this region. 
In order to conduct the survey, the online- based method is chosen which encompasses 
effectivity in terms of time and functionality, and which is useful in reaching a wider range of 
audience. The survey was conducted using the “survey monkey” online platform and was 
reached through the URL link which was sent to the emails of respondents. Before the link of 
the survey had been distributed, the social interaction with some of the officials was performed 
in order to represent the topic of the research and the need of their responses and thoughts about 
the issue. The other officials were contacted by emails in order to get their agreement to 
                                                          
183 Ibid., 237-38. 
39 
 
39 
 
participate in the research. Before sending the survey to the entire sample, the final version of 
the survey was tested on a small group of the officials in order to get their opinions about the 
survey, its quality, clarity of the questions and research purpose. The pilot procedure was 
performed with the diplomats from the embassy of Lithuania in the Netherlands. After the pilot 
procedure was completed, the link of the survey together with the additional information 
regarding the topic of the research and its problematic aspects was sent to the entire sample.  
Moreover, the letter contained a request to share the link of the survey with their colleagues who 
have an authoritative knowledge in the topic. In this respect, a bigger number of respondents 
was reached and such a “snowball” sampling was applied due to the difficulties to reach a wider 
range of the officials via personal email requests. In this respect, the survey received answers 
from 83 officials.   
The survey seeks to find out the opinion regarding the drawbacks of the EU’s CSDP and the 
EU’s actorness in the Ukrainian crisis. The survey pursues to reveal the main factors which 
influenced the EU to deploy a civilian instead of a military mission in Ukraine. In other words, 
the survey seeks to provide with the answers why the EU is so soft in the case of the Ukrainian 
crisis. In addition, the officials are asked to evaluate the risk coming from Russia to the Baltic 
region and their confidence in the EU’s CSDP. The questions of the survey is based on the 
characteristics of realists and constructivists theories and other scholars’ research in the area of 
the EU’s CSDP. While analyzing the Ukrainian crisis and the EU’s actorness in this case, 
meaning, the EU’s intentions to deploy a civilian versus military mission in the area, the research 
is also based on Engberg’s research on the EU’s military interventions. Engberg analyzes the 
factors or driving/inhibiting forces which influence the EU to deploy or not to deploy a military 
operation. In this thesis just the factors which are relevant for this study will be applied and used 
in the analysis of the EU’s actions regarding Ukraine.  In this respect, Engberg’s analytical tool 
will not be applied in its integrity but as a complementary tool for enriching the analysis and the 
main arguments of the thesis. Due to the complexity of the CSDP drawbacks and rationale 
behind the EU’s decision to deploy a civilian mission, the survey incorporates matrix questions 
which allow to capture responses to multiple arguments. Such a construction of the questions 
allows to see with what arguments the respondents tend to agree the most and which are less 
important in explaining the EU’s actorness through the CSDP. In addition, the survey also 
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includes open- ended questions and every question has an option to comment and add personal 
insights regarding the issue.  
In general, apart from being based on two case studies, the research is also based on primary 
and secondary sources. Primary sources which are used and analyzed in this thesis is mainly the 
EU’s official documents regarding the case of Ukraine and secondary sources consists of 
published articles, books and working papers. A survey conducted amongst the officials of the 
Baltic States serves as a complementing channel for the previous research findings and provides 
the thesis with the insights of the high officials from the Baltic States.  
5. The Case of Ukraine- why Snow White? 
 
5.1. A short background 
 
The origins of the Ukrainian crisis started in November 2013 with the announcement that 
Ukraine suspends preparations for signing an association agreement with the EU.184 Instead of 
a partnership with the EU, the former President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, turned towards 
Russia, which offered a package of 15 billion dollar aid for Ukraine.185 In addition to the aid, 
Russia pressured the president of Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union, which would become 
relevant just if Ukraine, the second largest former Soviet republic, would sign up as well. Any 
possible partnership between Ukraine and the EU would have seriously affected the Russian 
economy and influence in the region. Due to this reason, Russia has taken actions to stop further 
partnership between Ukraine and the EU. For example, a trade blockade which was carried out 
by Russia in August had to serve as a demonstration of consequences to Ukraine if it continues 
the integration process with the EU.186 The decision to suspend the association agreement 
between the EU and Ukraine was met with demonstrations of the Ukrainian people who 
protested against the regime. The protest which started as a result of the suspended association 
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agreement, shifted to the protests against government’s corruption. Violence escalated on the 
18th of February in 2014 in Kyiv when the government of Ukraine used force against the 
protestors. A few days later President Yanukovych fled Kyiv and a new interim- government 
was installed. However, the Ukrainian crisis was just about to begin. The tensions had increased 
after the Russian Parliament approved Putin’s request to use force in Ukraine in order to protect 
Russian speaking population in eastern and southern parts of Ukraine because, according to 
Moscow, the newly announced interim- government was threatening the rights of Russian 
minorities living in Ukraine.187 Moreover, President Putin declared that Russia would have all 
rights to use any means to save and protect Russian population living in that area, especially 
those who lived on the Crimean peninsula. 188 Due to this reason, Russia occupied Crimea on 
the 14th of March, 2014. The occupation was based on the results of referendum initiated by the 
Crimea’s parliament with the results of 1.5 million voters who agreed on the union with Russia. 
After the results of referendum Moscow abolished Ukrainian laws and put into force Russian 
legislation. 189  
5.2. Why Snow White? 
 
The Ukrainian crisis linked to Russia’s aggressive military intervention in Ukraine and an illegal 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula was a message about the collapse of the post- Cold War 
European Security architecture. These events sent shock waves to the EU as a security actor and 
revealed a challenge for the EU’s relationship with its powerful neighbor, Russia. 190 Moreover, 
the crisis uncovered the opposite roles of the two major actors, Russia and the EU, in their close 
neighborhood. On the one hand, the EU strengthening its political and economic partnership 
with eastern countries and spreading its values and interests in the area, and ensuring its security 
and stability close to its borders. On the other hand, Russia seeking to get back its influence in 
post- Soviet countries and portraying itself as a peace broker in Ukraine. 191 The annexation of 
the Crimean peninsula is the first territorial annexation by Russia since World War II, which is 
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considered legal and acceptable in the eyes of Russia.192 As Francois Heisbourg in his article 
stated:  
Russia emerges as a largely unpredictable player, which no longer gives prime importance 
to abiding (even in appearance) by international law, with a neo-imperial vision in the 
form of the Eurasian project and an across-the-board enmity for Western institutions in 
Europe and Western values in the world. This is a country with a tradition of seriousness 
of purpose when it comes to military affairs, and the ability to integrate the various tools 
of power and influence, from information operations to direct military intervention.193 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized that: “Russia is violating the territorial integrity 
and the sovereignty of Ukraine. It regards one of its neighbors, Ukraine, as part of a sphere of 
influence. After the horrors of two world wars and the end of the Cold War, this calls the entire 
European peaceful order into question”.194 The first political- military response to Russia’s 
actions came from NATO, which already in April undertook practical measures against Russia. 
The UN had also deployed a human rights monitoring mission in March, but having in mind 
that Russia has veto power in the UN Security Council, the UN actions were constrained.195 
However, The EU’s response came just on the 1st of December in 2014. Following the Ukrainian 
government requests and invitation, the EU launched a civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) 
under its Common Security and Defense Policy in Kyiv. The mission’s aim is to advice 
Ukrainian officials on the country’s civilian security reform (SSR- security sector reform) based 
on EU standards and principles of good governance and human rights.  A team of the mission 
with a slogan “advising for trust” is made of over 200 Ukrainian and international staff which 
is based in Kyiv. 196 Despite the fact that the EU has taken measures to support the Ukrainian 
government and incorporated sanctions against Russia, the events in eastern Ukraine showed 
that the European security system was helpless and ineffective, which puts into question the 
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future of the regional stability and security.197 The case study of the Ukrainian crisis will be 
analyzed and explained through the lenses of realism and constructivism and supported by the 
results of the conducted survey and other scholars’ work.  
5.2.1. A Realists point of view 
 
According to realists’ point of view, the missions of CSDP will be deployed in low- intensity 
and risk averse conflicts if its biggest member states- France, Germany and the UK- can get any 
gain out of it. 198 Here Member States’ interests play a crucial role which brings problematic 
circumstances for decision making and coordination of the policy. The EU applied very 
symbolic- diplomatic and economic- sanctions as a respond to Russia’s aggression towards 
Ukraine. 199 Those sanctions included political sanctions such as freezing the assets, bank 
accounts of the Russian officials, suspended talks with Russia on visa matters, introduced travel 
bans and economic sanctions which had to affect Russia’s economic negatively.200 In other 
words, the EU has initiated a soft respond to Russia’s aggressiveness and even though it issued 
more robust sanctions after Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot, the EU was portraying 
those sanctions as a “positive incentive” which meant to lead to a diplomatic solution of the 
conflict, but not to punish Russia. As Novoky states, the EU chose soft balancing Russia.201 
According to soft balancing theory, it includes diplomatic and/ or economic measures of a 
weaker state which seeks to undermine a stronger state. Soft balancing is an option for states 
which have common interests in balancing a stronger state but do not seek to confront it 
directly.202 In the case of Ukraine, the mission EUAM reflects the EU Member States’ positions 
towards Russia, which is soft balance and minimization of any direct risk to confront Russia 
directly. Moreover, different Member States have different interests and policy priorities 
regarding Russia which influence actions the EU undertakes. The situation goes hand in hand 
with Realists point of view that the interests and priorities of the Member States play a crucial 
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role in making decisions and they are the key drivers of the EU’s common security strategy. 
Regarding the Ukrainian crisis, the situation was perceived as a very sensitive and it brought a 
division between the Member States. One group of the Member States were seeking the EU to 
act decisively and support Ukraine. In this respect, the EU should clearly take the side of 
Ukraine. Novoky in his article named that group of Member States as “hawks” which included 
countries like Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the UK. Those countries reflected their 
broader policy towards Russia. “Hawkish” member states wanted that the scope of the mission 
would be broad, the duration to be long and the size to be large. On the other hand, the other 
group of the Member States were seeking to introduce softer actions towards Russia and were 
quite reluctant in taking sides in the conflict. As Novoky declared, this group was consisted of 
the EU’s “doves” and it included countries such as Finland, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy and 
the Netherlands. However, there were more Member States who were unwilling to do anything 
that would cause a direct confrontation with Russia. 203 For example, Germany was concerned 
about the problematic closure of the mission if the situation in Ukraine did not get better by the 
end of the mission and which could follow the pattern of the previous mission in Bosnia 
(EUFOR Althea) which marked its 10th anniversary in 2014. In this respect, those Member 
States which were particularly concerned about this outcome wanted the mission to be short.204 
In addition, Novaky also indicates that there were a contradiction amongst the Member States 
regarding the size of the mission. Some member states, like Poland, wanted that the mission to 
include personnel of around 200, while Germany and Italy were intended to deploy 100 
personnel. Furthermore, Poland and Lithuania wanted the mission to outreach the entire territory 
of Ukraine, meanwhile Germany and Finland wanted the mission to operate just in Kiev.205 
Moreover, most of the Member States have different interests towards Russia and there exists 
also the bilateral relations between the Member States and Russia, which would be compounded 
if the EU would undertook harder security means. Since the end of the Cold War, most of the 
EU’s Member States have developed close economic and political ties with Russia which 
resulted in heavy economic interdependence. For example, many countries are dependent on 
Russian natural gas imports, for other Member States, such as Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
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Russia is an important partner for agricultural exports. Moreover, at the beginning of the crisis 
France was about to sell two military ships to Russia, placing its relations with Russia over the 
Ukrainian crisis.206 Meanwhile, Germany exports around 38 billion of euros in goods and 
services to Russia.207 These close ties with Russia disclose costs for most of the Member States 
while confronting Moscow, which for some of them are too high, and those countries seek very 
robust and soft instruments against illegal Russia’s actions. 208Furthermore, there are already 
some announcements from the Member States that even the sanctions towards Russia should be 
eased as it affects countries’ economies due to their bilateral relations with Russia. Statements 
like this proves the core concepts of Realism like “egoism” and “self- interest”. According to 
Engberg, political interests are one of the internal factors which may be driving or inhibiting in 
deploying a military operation. In the case of Ukraine, different interests of the Member States 
worked as inhibiting factor in deploying a military mission and the EU’s goal to avoid any direct 
confrontation with Russia in order to protect Member States’ relationships with Russia, can be 
perceived as an external inhibiting factor.  According to the survey results, 53 percent of the 
respondents totally agree on the statement that the EU tends to avoid direct confrontation with 
Russia and, in this respect, deploys the civilian mission instead of a military. Other 40 percent 
of the respondents tend to support this statement as well, while just 7 percent was likely not to 
agree with this argument. Such results support Novoky’s argument of soft balancing as a reason 
not to confront Russia directly.  
On the other hand, even though the EU has chosen to soft balance Russia while deploying the 
civilian mission in Ukraine, it is still a strong signal to Russia that the EU supports the 
government of Ukraine and its people. 209 However, the Member States’ priorities and diverging 
views to the use of force make the CSDP more complicated. 210 According to the survey, the 
reason that the EU did not deploy military mission because of the opposition of the Member 
States was supported by 71 percent of the respondents while the rest was more likely to agree 
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with the statement. Very similar results are found regarding different Member States interests 
vis a vis Russia which played a role in the EU’s response to the Ukrainian crisis. The priorities 
of the EU concerning the intentions to use civilian over military means was supported by more 
than a half of the respondents. Looking to the trend of the results stated above, the reasons for 
deploying the civilian mission is found in the interests of the Member States, which approve 
Realists point of view that the Member States tend to intervene if there is any political gain 
which serves their interests, however the countries did not find any political gain in the situation 
of Ukraine.  According to Engberg, military intervention is more likely to happen in former 
colonies of the main Member States or where the EU have already intervened before, however, 
this fact can not be applied in the case of Ukraine. In addition, Engberg states that the EU decides 
to intervene military in the cases which can provide an opportunity rather than a challenge. On 
the other hand, the answers of the survey revealed quite dispersed opinions- 45 percent of the 
respondents did not agree that the Ukrainian crisis was too challenging for the EU, however, 
over 50 percent of the officials were more likely to agree with the challenging nature of the 
Ukrainian crisis. Paradoxically, the most majority of the respondents were of the opinion that 
the Ukrainian crisis includes high risks which supports the argument that the EU deploys 
military mission if the situation is risk averse and less challenging. Moreover, Engberg also 
argues that the missions is more likely to happen if there is an agreement with local actors.  In 
the case of Ukraine, there was an invitation of the Ukrainian government for the CSDP mission. 
However, the Member States of the EU restrained Ukraine from asking for a military 
intervention while helping to write a draft letter of request for a civilian CSDP mission. Such an 
initiative supports the argument that the EU was highly trying to avoid any direct confrontation 
with Russia.  
The results of the survey supported the ideas of Realists. The main factors inhibiting the use of 
any hard force are the interests of the Member States which influence the response of the EU in 
security and defense matters. In the case of Ukraine, there were more Member States which 
were seeking to keep good bilateral relations with Russia than to use any power against illegal 
actions of Russia.  
5.2.2. A Constructivists point of view 
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Despite diverging perspectives and interests, the EU managed to reach a common decision 
between the Member States to respond to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Can it be that norms and 
responsibilities outweighed the interests and rational calculations?211 In contrast to Realists 
material thinking, Constructivists concentrate on the identities, norms and cultures of the actors 
which shape their actions and choices in a given situation.  As Constructivist theory has been 
widely used in analyzing the CSDP, the EU’s actions in Ukraine will be explored through the 
prism of constructivism as well. The EU’s images, roles, responsibilities, values, visibility and 
the differences of the Member States’ cultures interplay as important features in the framework 
of the CSDP. According to constructivists approach, the EU place its external image as a very 
important factor in the international arena, as well as its roles and responsibilities in a given 
situation influence the way other actors view the EU and perceives its importance as an actor. 
The missions under the CSDP gives an opportunity for the EU to increase its scope of actions, 
spread the EU’s values and enhance the EU’s visibility on the world stage. In addition, the 
differences between the Member States regarding their foreign policy traditions, identities and 
cultures shapes the preferences towards the use of force which together influence the outcome 
and development of the EU’s security and defense framework. In connection with the Ukrainian 
crisis, the EU’s presence in its eastern neighborhood was perceived as its duty and responsibility 
and, in this respect, taking no action position was not acceptable for such an actor as the EU. 
The Member States felt a particular responsibility for Ukraine due to the EU’s relationships with 
Ukraine and the fact that Ukraine is close geographically to the Union.212 Moreover, the 
European Council in March 2014 stated that the EU acquire a special responsibility for peace 
and stability in Europe.213 It was broadly agreed that the crisis in Ukraine is a direct 
responsibility of the EU to act and show discontent with Russia. In addition, as Manuel Barroso 
said, the EU had a duty and responsibility to act as a community, but also the actions of the EU 
were triggered by the expectations of protestors at Maidan, that the EU as an alley of peace 
would stand their side.  
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A common agreement for response was also reached because the USA from the very beginning 
was warning about its desire to play a minor role in the crisis, which meant that the EU had no 
alternatives just to act itself in the crisis.  According to Engberg, the views of other relevant 
actors is an important factor in the decision to intervene militarily. If other security providers 
support the operation, then it is more likely for an intervention. However, the USA in the 
beginning showed its reluctance to be involved in the crisis and the UN’s abilities was 
constrained by Russia’s veto. Once could say that a weak support of the relevant actors 
influenced the EU’s soft actions in Ukraine. The EU was left to act itself and following its 
responsibility to do something it deployed a civilian mission in Ukraine. According to the survey 
results, the biggest majority of the respondents supported the argument that the EU deployed a 
civilian mission instead of a military because it felt responsibility to do something regarding the 
Ukrainian crisis and the civilian mission was more acceptable and easier reachable than a 
military mission. Moreover, the EU’s presence influences the perception of other actors and 
elites towards the EU, which means that expectations of other security actors towards the EU is 
an important factor for the EU’s image construct and meaning making.  In addition, while “doing 
something”, having in mind the civilian mission, the EU as a security actor can keep its 
visibility, spread its values and promote its norms. According to Bretherton and Vogler, the 
Ukrainian crisis is also an opportunity for the EU to act and show itself to the external world.  
Such an opportunity allows the EU to prove that it is capable to respond as well as implement 
its norms and values as a security provider.214  In Novaky’s words, the CSDP missions under 
the EU’s flag allow to channel its visibility and values as well. The EUAM mission allowed the 
EU to mark its territory and to be visible on the world stage.215 As the survey results revealed, 
more than a half of the respondents agreed that the Ukrainian crisis is an opportunity for the EU 
to spread its identity, values and increase visibility, however, 36 percent of the respondents do 
not see this as a reason to deploy a civilian mission versus a military one. Moreover, quite 
diverse opinions are found regarding the EU’s rationale to deploy a civilian mission far from 
the centrum of the crisis in order to avoid high risks and still be visible. 
As Bailes noted in her article, there exists a contradiction between two different poles of self- 
perception- the EU’s nature of representing itself as an alley of good and peace and the other 
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one endowing that alley with the military force and capabilities. The image and identity of ‘a 
good cop” does not match with military means.216 Even though the military power was perceived 
as an important factor in shaping the EU’s image in the international arena, the civilian power 
is identified as the main EU’s mean of power while military instruments plays just a role of 
prestige. The EU’s presence in its eastern neighborhood state channels its identity which 
encapsulates shared understandings, its values and norms in terms of what is appropriate or not 
to do in a given situation.217 According to Telo, the EU perceives itself as a civilian power, 
which uses soft and smart power instead of hard or military power. The respondents of the 
survey is of the opinion that the EU prioritizes soft power versus military one. Telo states that 
from the EU’s values and its historical experiences or historical memories derives  from 
international or historical responsibility to show the third parties that the EU itself went from 
war to a community identified with solidarity, peace and prosperity. This narrative can also be 
found in the EU’s historical memory pattern which leads to the learning process of two World 
Wars which influenced the EU to choose soft power to military power.218 In this respect, the EU 
might prioritize civilian over military power due to its image as a good and peaceful alley. In 
the case of Ukraine, the results of the Survey showed that the majority of the respondents agree 
with the EU’s image as a good cop as a reason for soft power. 
One of the accomplishments of Constructivism arises from its concentration on the differences 
between the Member States in terms of their foreign policies’ traditions and cultures which 
influence the CSDP and the decision to use force. 219 The example of the Ukrainian crisis and 
the EU’s response to it can be an illustration of the common agreement amongst the Member 
States and once could say that the Member States have developed similar understandings, a 
sense of community, belonging and a sense of common purpose. 220 According to Bretherton 
and Vogler, that is the EU’s internal capacity or capability to make a decision and decide on the 
instruments of the policy. However, this capability depends on the Member States willingness 
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and shared priorities in a given situation to act collectively.221 In the case of Ukraine, even if 
there was an agreement for common response to Russia’s aggression, that response was quite 
soft and revealed some disagreements between the Member States. The reasons for this dispute 
can be found in different historical experiences with Russian power between the Member States 
which affect their views on the situation and ways of responding to it. The most initiative to 
respond to Russia’s aggression was taken by its close neighbors and former member states of 
the Warsaw Pact like Poland and the Baltic States and, according to those countries, a harder 
policy towards Russia was appropriate way to respond to the crisis. In addition, the UK and 
Sweden raised their concerns about the situation in Ukraine and the need for a collective 
response. The UK and Sweden mostly driven by a sense of solidarity and the desire to show the 
world the EU’s values and norms under which Russia’s actions in Ukraine are not acceptable 
and there was a need to act appropriately.222 In addition Sweden might also be driven by its 
historical experience with Russia in 1981. On the other spectrum of the common agreement 
there were countries which did not live through a harsh historical experiences with Russia, felt 
no historical similarity with Ukraine and intended for more robust actions as a response to the 
illegal actions of Russia. Such rationale and importance of the divergent security strategies in 
the decision making was supported by the majority of the respondents. 
However, in reality, apart from robust and soft economic and political sanctions against Russia 
and a package of financial aid to Ukraine, there was nothing much the EU as a community had 
done. The Ukrainian crisis is one more example which highlighted the EU’s “expectations gap” 
in its CSDP. 223 As Menon and Rumer addressed, that the EU’s ability and willingness to sustain 
its assistance and interest in Ukraine under the civilian mission (EUAM) should not be taken 
for granted in the future. 224 
6. The Baltics in an upcoming storm 
 
                                                          
221 Vogler and Bretherton, 24. 
222 Sjursen and Rosén,  27. 
223 Rihards Bambals, "European Security, Defence, and Global Role: A Year after Crimea," The War in Ukraine: 
Lessons for Europe  (2015): 22. 
224 Rajan Menon and Eugene B Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post--Cold War Order (MIT 
Press, 2015), 154. 
51 
 
51 
 
The events in Ukraine in 2014 are one of the most shocking affairs in the 21st century which 
created a sense of insecurity and instability in Central and Eastern countries. The annexation of 
Crimea made Russia the biggest threat in the region, and no other countries than the Baltic States 
are more threatened and more vulnerable having this actor in their close neighborhood.225 These 
three countries are threatened more due to their historical experiences which formed a special 
security culture. Memories of the past formed an identity of antagonism towards Russia which 
explains why the Baltics support more harsh actions regarding the Russian illegal annexation of 
Crimea.226 According to the survey results, 63 percent of the officials from the Baltic States 
stated that the actions of the EU regarding its sanctions towards Russia are not sufficient, while 
32 percent said they are not sufficient at all. Which allows to make a conclusion that the Baltic 
States support more rigid actions towards Russia.   
The worrying signs of Russian aggressive actions were already in Georgia in 2008. 227 Following 
this war the EU deployed an unarmed civilian mission (EUMM) and for Russia the war served 
as a way of learning and checking the limits. Moscow discovered that “if surprised with military 
action outside the EU or NATO, the West would likely retreat fearing political or even military 
escalation”228. The question here stands as follow: what if the aggressor targets not outside but 
inside of the EU, would the West stay in the same manner as a “snow white”? Moreover, Russia 
had seen political divisions in the EU over Russian politics, lack of unity and political will to 
stop or to take any serious actions against the aggressor. The war in Georgia should have shaken 
the world and it had to be a clear message that Russia is going to flex its muscles.229 However, 
the West collectively hit the snooze button with a hope that they will never need to wake up. 
Then the Ukrainian crisis hit and the West found themselves unprepared again.230 After the 
Ukrainian war had started, the EU showed its weakness to respond and it also revealed that 
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Europeans are left with very weak and almost vanishing military capabilities. Such a reaction 
of the West and small capabilities to act may determine the world order in the nearest future.231  
There is no doubt that such a geopolitical situation gives the biggest reasons for fears in the 
Baltic States. Those fears are supported by Russia’s leader highlighted priorities which is to 
bring the ex- USSR into a single geopolitical unit, which would reestablish the greatness of 
Russia. The examples of Georgia and Ukraine show that Putin is following his priorities while 
combining skillful diplomatic moves with military activity.232 In this respect, being very 
vulnerable, the Baltic States required for permanent NATO troops to be deployed in the Baltics. 
However, Angela Merkel rejected such a request, because stationing permanent troops in the 
Baltic area would violate a 1997 NATO- Russian agreement on troop deployment in Europe. 
Instead, she supported a rapid response force which would be able to operate within few days 
in case of a danger from Russia in the Baltic States. 233 Such European response to the requests 
of the Baltic States shows its weakness and fears to confront Russia. The argument that 
stationing permanent troops would violate the agreement is a very questionable as Russia is 
already in full violation of it.234 The best what NATO has done so far is deployment of rotating 
forces in Eastern Europe. Estonia is hosting 800 troops, Latvia and Lithuania each are hosting 
1200 troops. The Baltic States together with Poland are hosting 7200 troops from across 28 
NATO Member States. 235 However, the numbers are not big comparing to the capabilities of 
Russia which owns the most militarized place in the world just behind the border. Such NATO 
acts is obviously not enough for the Baltic States to be secured. Furthermore, commander of the 
US army in Europe, Gen Hodges, warned, that Russia could capture the capitals of Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia in as little as 36 hours, much quicker than NATO could get there to defend 
them.236 But what about the EU? Would it take any serious actions? Would it deploy a military 
mission under the CSDP as a response to possible Russia’s aggression in the Baltic States? Such 
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a scenario is very doubtful, as Moscow’s provocations and aggressive surprise military exercises 
with the scenario of occupation or isolation have already been performed many times, and, 
unfortunately, those episodes have gone unnoticed by Western Europe which seems is living 
within an image of a region with zero risk.237 Moreover, looking at Engbergs’ driving factors 
for the EU’s military mission, the Baltic States do not meet that many of them. For the EU it 
would be too risky, too challenging, the Baltics are not former colonies of the main Member 
States, but peripheries of Russian empire. Moreover, taking the example of Ukraine, even if the 
mission was supported by local governments, it did not influence the deployment of the military 
mission. In addition, the EU’s Member States do not have any interests in the Baltic States and 
there is a risk that the Baltic States will be sacrificed over the Member States’ interests and 
relations with Russia. The two major protagonists on the Baltic States security are Germany and 
France which participate quite actively in joint exercises and support NATO’s collective 
defense. However, they are not expected to take the lead or to deploy significant forces in an 
emergency situation in the Baltic States. Germany and France are more likely to take political 
role vis-à-vis Russia than to be active in defending the Baltics.238 Once may argue that the 
Baltics can rely on the NATO, however, already with the start of the Georgian war in 2008, then 
Barack Obama demanded from NATO to set up serious plans to defend the Baltics, the NATO 
did not make any serious proposals how the alliance would defend the Baltic States. Moreover, 
Russia’s military exercises (Zapad 2009) received a response from the NATO just in 2013 with 
a conduction of military exercise where it rehearsed the defense of the Baltics and Poland. 
However, Germany expressed its strong opposition to the exercise, as it may annoy Russia.239 
Such an opposition has been seen in Ukraine as well, where any hard or serious actions were 
rejected in order to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. Paradoxically, Ukraine which is not 
the member of the NATO contributed more solders to the exercise than most of the big Western 
countries.240 Such an example leads to constructivist’s ideas, that countries have different 
understandings about the use of force and such understandings might be influenced by historical 
experiences or different security cultures. In Eastern Europe Russia is perceived as a real threat 
and those countries tend to support more harsh means to compel this threat. However, countries 
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who do not have the same experiences tend to look through the fingers and express 
unwillingness to act or act softly as it is easier and less expensive.  
According to Gladysh, the Baltic States, being members of both NATO and the EU, and 
therefore part of the CSDP is still more likely to think that NATO is the main guarantor of their 
security and stability, meanwhile, Russia is the main source of instability.241 In line with the 
results of the survey, 66 percent of the survey respondents totally agreed and 25 percent tend to 
agree with the argument that Russia is a real threat to the Baltic States. The risk of Russian 
intervention in the Baltic States was evaluated by 60 percent of the officials as a big risk and by 
31 percent as a very big risk. However, the priority regarding NATO as a main security provider 
lays in the lack of confidence in the CSDP and its ability to confront serious threats. 242As the 
results of the survey showed, 82 percent of the officials are not confident about the EU’s 
capacity to confront Russia in case of intervention in the Baltic States. The Baltic States know 
that their military capabilities will not be able to stand against Russia’s aggression, however, if 
the NATO response might arrive too late and the EU would play its soft power game, the Baltics 
might be left to fight the invaders alone. 243 
It is apparent that the EU meets the aggression of Russia with its soft instruments.  European 
Russian dialogue over Ukrainian crisis revealed two different political cultures: “where the West 
was trying to apply rules of polite common sense searching for accommodation, while the 
Russian side was ready to use any tools available, including military threats”244. Simultaneously, 
the EU within its CSDP shows its hesitation in being more active, demonstrates lack of unity, 
decisiveness, decreased influence and almost disappearing hard military tools which leads to 
stagnation and diminishing actorness on the international stage. The EU’s diplomatic tools 
regarding Ukraine crisis, such as sanctions, gave some kind of relief in the EU, which hesitates 
to take any serious actions but still wants to play a role in security matters. Unfortunately, such 
kindness does not solve the problems and does not stop the Russian aggression. Contrarily, as 
Estonian President remarked, it causes an increased appetite for new demands.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
The EU has revealed a certain capacity as a crisis management actor in the framework of CSDP. 
Until now the EU has conducted 34 missions in Europe and beyond. These operations are 
considered to be the most tangible contributions made by the EU on the international stage 
regarding security. 245 It was already in 1998 then France and the United Kingdom agreed that 
“the Union must have a capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, 
the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so” and such an agreement had to make 
the EU a significant security and defense actor. 246 However, a lot of disappointment came with 
the EU’s CSDP and many of the EU’s conducted missions highlighted difficulties and 
frustration which do not play favorably to the EU’s image as a security actor. 247  
The record of the EU’s missions is impressive, however, most of the missions have been 
criticized for being limited in size and scope, unambitious, modest militarily and barely made 
any serious actions in difficult security issues. One of the limits the CSDP missions revealed is 
member states unwillingness to act and contribute to the missions. According to Realists, the 
Member States tend to cooperate only if there is an interest to do so and usually that interest is 
based on the costs and benefits calculations. The lack of consensus between the Member States 
as one of the EU’s CSDP drawbacks was totally supported by over 75 percent of the survey 
respondents. Moreover, in a decision making procedure the Member States tend to prioritize 
their own benefits, and in this respect, the strongest countries can shape and influence the EU’s 
actions in security issues. The majority of the respondents are of the opinion that such a 
drawback burdens the EU’s actions under its CSDP. Meanwhile, constructivists point to the 
Member States’ diverging norms on the use of force which results in the absence of a common 
European strategic culture. Such an obstacle is supported by more than a half of the respondents, 
while 31 percent of the officials was unlikely to agree with absence of a common European 
security culture. The results go in line with some of other scholars who state that there is a 
consensus between the Member States on non- military instruments which proves that the EU’s 
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security culture has evolved. However, one of the biggest disappointments come from the EU’s 
priorities of soft means over military ones, which makes the EU a soft security provider. Even 
though the EU possesses a unique tool which encompasses civilian and military means, it does 
not use of the capabilities at its disposal.  
The thesis analyzes the EU’s actions regarding the Ukrainian crisis and its capabilities in the 
Baltic States. In other words, the thesis tries to find out why the EU’s actions in Ukraine and its 
response to Russia’s aggressiveness is so soft and weak, and if the EU is a credible security 
actor in the Baltic States. As the study revealed, the EU’s actions in Ukraine were evaluated as 
not sufficient by almost all respondents of the survey. Such a discontent with the EU’s response 
can be explained by historical experiences which led to the formation of antagonism towards 
Russia, and in this respect, the Baltics support more harsh actions regarding Russia’s policy. 
One of the biggest reasons for the EU’s soft response in Ukraine was a division between the 
Member States. One group of the Member States such as Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden 
and the UK were seeking the EU to act decisively and support Ukraine, while other Member 
States such as Finland, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands were unwilling to 
do anything that would cause a direct confrontation with Russia.  Such a division between the 
Member States appear due to the Member Stats’ divergent interests and bilateral relations vis a 
vis Russia, which would be compounded if the EU undertook harder security means. The results 
of the survey support the ideas of Realists- the Member States interests and cost benefit 
calculations influence the response of the EU in security and defense matters. In the case of 
Ukraine, there were more Member States which were seeking to keep good bilateral relations 
with Russia than to use any power against illegal actions of Russia. In addition, the results of 
the survey revealed that the Ukrainian crisis contained high risks and no opportunity, which, 
according to Engberg, are one of the inhibiting factors for the EU to deploy a military mission. 
Moreover, Engberg also argues that the missions is more likely to happen if there is an 
agreement with local actors.  However, there was an invitation of the Ukrainian government for 
the CSDP mission, but the Member States restrained Ukraine from asking for a military 
intervention while helping to write a draft letter of request for a civilian CSDP mission. Engberg 
also argues that military intervention is more likely to happen in former colonies of the main 
Member States, however, this factor can not be applied in the case of Ukraine.  
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The missions under the CSDP gives an opportunity for the EU to increase its scope of actions, 
spread the EU’s values and enhance the EU’s visibility on the world stage. More than a half of 
the respondent were of the opinion that the EU’s presence in its eastern neighborhood was 
perceived as its duty and responsibility which is driven by identity related and self- imposed 
image construction and, in this respect, taking no action position was not acceptable for such an 
actor as the EU. In addition, while “doing something”, the EU as a security actor is more likely 
to keep its visibility, spread its values and promote its norms. Furthermore, according to 
Engberg, the views of other relevant actors is an important factor in the decision to intervene 
militarily. However, the USA in the beginning showed its reluctance to be involved in the crisis 
and the UN’s abilities was constrained by Russia’s veto. Once could say that a weak support of 
the relevant actors influenced the EU’s soft actions in Ukraine. In addition, there are scholars 
who state, that the EU’s image as “good cop” does not match with military means, which means 
that the EU is more likely to use soft power. As the results of the survey showed, over half of 
the respondents are of the opinion that the EU prioritizes civilian over military instruments in 
crisis management and that is the case in Ukraine as well. The crisis also revealed the differences 
between the Member States in terms of their foreign policies’ traditions and cultures which 
influence the CSDP and the decision to use force which worked as an inhibiting factor in the 
Ukrainian crisis. The reasons for this division can be found in different historical experiences 
with Russian power between the Member States which affect their views on the situation and 
ways of responding to it. The most initiative to respond to Russia’s aggression was taken by its 
close neighbors and former member states of the Warsaw Pact like Poland and the Baltic States. 
Meanwhile, countries which did not live through a harsh historical experiences with Russia, felt 
no historical similarity with Ukraine and intended for more robust actions as a response to the 
illegal actions of Russia.  
“The aggression of Russia against Ukraine is a litmus test for the CSDP concerning the national 
security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.”248 The example of Ukraine and the EU’s soft and 
reluctant response raises a question if the EU would be willing to deploy a military mission as 
a response to Russia’s aggression in the Baltic States or the scenario of Ukraine would be 
repeated there as well. However, looking at the case of Ukraine and the results of the analysis, 
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The Baltics seem to be in a very similar situation. In case of Russia’s invasion, such a case for 
the EU would be too risky, too challenging, moreover, the Baltic States are peripheries of the 
Russian empire and even if there is a support from the local government for a military mission, 
it does not mean that the military mission would be deployed, as the example of Ukraine showed. 
In addition, the EU’s Member States do not have interests in the Baltic States and there is a risk 
that the Baltic States would be sacrificed over the Member States’ interests and relations with 
Russia. Furthermore, as the study has showed, the divergent cultural aspects, identities and 
historical experiences of the Member States influence the decision on the use of force, however, 
such a factor may not work favorably to the Baltic States. In this respect, there is no surprise 
that the Baltics are not confident about the EU’s capabilities in their security environment. Once 
could say that the Baltics can rely on NATO or UN. However, the NATO can not deploy 
permanent forces in the region and in case of emergency the NATO may arrive too late, 
meanwhile, the UN is not a fully credible actor as well because Russia has veto power in the 
UN Security Council. In this respect, if the NATO response might arrive too late and the EU 
would play its soft power game, the Baltics might be left to fight the invaders alone.   
Putin’s Russia offers the EU a challenge to act and also re-evaluate its principles and priorities 
regarding the CSDP. However, the EU chooses unwillingness to act and offers divisive, easy 
solutions at the expense of its unity, cooperation and security. Such “laziness”, which is a result 
of historical factors and meaning making, unfortunately, attacks the core liberal values and 
political principles on which the EU stands. As a consequence, the EU becomes a smaller and 
softer power in international arena. The EU as Snow White: pure, innocent, helpless and naïve, 
chose to bite the poisoned apple, which sent her into the Sleeping Death. 
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Apendix1 
 
 
Figure 1 The Baltic Sea Region, source: NATO review magazine, retrieved from: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/security-baltic-defense-nato/EN/index.htm 
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Apendix2 
 
1. What is your country of origin? 
 
 
2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following drawbacks of the EU's 
CSDP: 
 
 
3. Evaluate if the EU's response to the Ukrainian crisis while deploying a civilian mission 
(EUAM) is: 
 
 
 
38.55%
32
31.33%
26
30.12%
25
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
Totally agree– Tend to agree– Tend to disagree Totally disagree Total
51.81% 38.55% 9.64% 0.00% 100.00%
43 32 8 0 83
37.35% 30.12% 31.33% 1.20% 100.00%
31 25 26 1 83
77.11% 18.07% 4.82% 0.00% 100.00%
64 15 4 0 83
75.90% 12.05% 3.61% 8.43% 100.00%
63 10 3 7 83
48.19% 37.35% 14.46% 0.00% 100.00%
40 31 12 0 83
The EU's CSDP is a soft security provider
The EU's CSDP is lacking common security 
strategy
The Member States prioritize their own 
benefits in the decision making process of 
the EU's CSDP
The EU's CSDP is lacking consensus between 
the Member States 
The missions under the CSDP are small 
scale, modest military and risk averse
46.99%
39
49.40%
41
3.61%
3
0.00%
0
0.00%
0
Insufficient at all
Adequate
Sufficient
Excessive
Insufficient
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4. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following reasons of the EU's 
intentions to deploy a civilian mission instead of a military mission in Ukraine:  
 
 
5. Evaluate if the EU's diplomatic and economic measures towards Russia are: 
 
 
 
 
Totally agree– Tend to agree– Tend to disagree– Totally disagree Total
50.00% 18.00% 32.00% 0.00% 100.00%
42 15 27 0 83
53.00% 40.00% 7.00% 0.00% 100.00%
44 33 6 0 83
36.00% 60.00% 4.00% 0.00% 100.00%
30 50 3 0 83
71.00% 29.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
59 24 0 0 83
21.00% 34.00% 45.00% 0.00% 100.00%
17 28 37 0 83
77.31% 22.69% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
64 19 0 0 83
19.82% 36.38% 36.40% 7.40% 100.00%
16 30 30 6 83
9.09% 54.55% 36.36% 0.00% 100.00%
8 45 30 0 83
6.02% 67.47% 26.51% 0.00% 100.00%
5 56 22 0 83
52.03% 33.96% 14.01% 0.00% 100.00%
43 28 12 0 83
15.83% 35.72% 48.45% 7.16% 100.00%
13 30 40 6 83
The EU prioritizes civilian over military 
instruments
The EU intends to avoid direct confrontation 
with Russia
The Ukrainian crisis includes high political 
and operational risk
The opposition of the Member States to 
deploy a military mission
The Member States have divergent interests 
vis a vis Russia
Military means contradict w ith the EU's image 
as a "good cop"
The civilian mission works as an opportunity 
to increase the EU's visibility and spread the 
EU's values
The Ukrainian crisis is too challenging
The Member States have different security 
cultures which influence the decision to use 
force
The civilian mission was held because the EU 
felt responsibility to do "something"
The civilian mission allows the EU to maintain 
its role without taking too much risks
32.34%
27
63%
52
5.04%
4
0.00%
0
0.00%
0
Insufficient at all
Insufficient 
Adequate
Sufficient
Excessive
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6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that Russia is a real threat 
to the Baltic States? 
 
 
7. In your opinion, how big is a risk of Russia's intervention into the Baltic States? 
 
 
8. Are you confident about the EU's capacity in assisting and supporting the Baltic States 
in case of Russia's intervention? 
 
9. Do you have any personal reflections? (Optional) 
“First of all, the biggest EU members are looking for their national interests and do not care 
about newcomers, Eastern EU members. Second, EU Military / Security forces are significantly 
degraded in the last 10 years and need to be rebuild their capabilities in order to be capable to 
respond to current challenges (Russia, Refugees, Terrorism). However, EU without US is not 
capable to dial with such challenges.” 
66.26%
55
24.65%
20
9.09%
8
0.00%
0
Totally agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Totally disagree
0.00%
0
5.65%
5
3.12%
3
60.15%
50
31.08%
26
Big risk
Very big risk
Medium
Low  risk 
Very low  risk
82.15%
68
14.84%
12
3.01%
2
Confident
Very confident 
Not confident
